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Journeys in the Shadow Private Rented Sector 
 
 
Foreword 
 
ƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐƉŝŽŶĞĞƌŝŶŐƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ,ŽƵƐĞǁĂƐĨŽƵŶĚĞĚƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ
ƐŽĐŝĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ?th ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ‘ƐůƵŵ ?ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚƐ ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ?ǁĞďĞŐĂŶǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂƚĂ
grass roots level to empower local people to tackle the social problems created by urbanisation and 
industrialisation. Since then  W for the past 131 years  W we have pursued a vision of a society without 
poverty where all people are valued, treated equally, and lead fulfilling and productive lives. Our 
innovative work contributed to the 1906 Liberal welfare reforms and the creation of the welfare 
state. Today, Cambridge House continues to work in ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐŵŽƐƚĚĞƉƌŝǀĞĚĂƌĞĂƐƚŽƚĂĐŬůĞ
social exclusion, enable people to transition out of crisis, and progress towards independence. 
 
Safer Renting is the only service of its kind  W ĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂƚĞƐƚĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ?ƐŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ
approach to delivering its vision of a society without poverty. Its mission is simple: to keep 
vulnerable, low-income residents in their homes and off the streets, empowering individuals and 
bolstering communities whose problems are largely hidden from view. Against this backdrop, it is 
ƵŶƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƌŽŐƵĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ŚĂƐĞŶƚĞƌĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞǆŝĐŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ
decade: it is a product of a private rental market serving low-income Londoners, which is under-
regulated, exploitative, and characterised by dangerously poor physical standards and insecurity of 
tenure. Yet, as this report illustrates, the term is also an unhelpful one: eliding ill-informed landlords 
with criminals who wilfully exploit vulnerable tenants. 
 
This report sets out a range of recommendations for how policymakers should take urgent action to 
tackle the bleak picture facing people stuck in the low-income private rental sector. Three themes 
are worth highlighting. First, that law-enforcement agencies need to do more to prevent illegal 
evictions, making better use of existing powers within the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 and 
taking advantage of temporary powers available to police during the Covid-19 crisis. Second, a new 
regulatory framework is required to oversee the private rental sector, with a particular focus on 
providers of low-income tenancies. Third, that poor housing has contributed to the unacceptably low 
levels of progress towards equality for people of BAME origin  W addressing the impact of poor 
quality, multi-occupancy and insecure housing is an essential part of the response to structural 
inequalities highlighted by the Black Lives Movement. 
 
Safer Renting has made significant progress in helping vulnerable tenants over the past few years  W 
but this report shows how more work remains to be done to make private renting safe for everyone.   
 
Simon Latham, 
Chair of Trustees, Cambridge House 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
1 Context and method 
 
Safer Renting delivers tenancy relations services to six London boroughs and supports 
around 200 tenants a year where the property is subject to local authority enforcement 
activity. DƵĐŚŽĨƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐŚĂĚŽǁ ?ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƌ ŶƚĞĚƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?WZ^ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
highly vulnerable tenants are targeted by criminal landlords and letting agents deliberately 
undertaking multiple breaches of tenancy and housing law in order to maximise their rental 
profit.  
Landlords in the shadow PRS aim to evade detection through the use of identity fraud, use 
of unconventional tenancy agreements where there may be uncertainty around tenancy 
rights, and often use non-standard properties or subdivided properties to increase rental 
yield through high-density overcrowding. 
These landlords can be distinguished from landlords who may be well-intentioned but not 
fully conversant with their responsibilities.  
The shadow PRS also includes letting agents, who may act in concert with landlords or 
defraud both landlords and tenants.  
In the last ten years, London has been a favourable context for the growth of criminality in 
the PRS: rents are high relative to property quality; market pressures create a tolerance for 
overcrowding amongst tenants; there is a growing population of economic migrants; 
cutbacks in enforcement; an unwieldy legal framework; poor support for tenants seeking 
legal recourse; low penalties for convicted offenders; and growing use of the internet where 
identities are harder to verify.  
 
Limited research has directly explored criminality in the PRS, although third-sector data 
indicates that tenant experience of illegal eviction, harassment and abusive and threatening 
behaviour from landlords is not uncommon. 
 
dŚŝƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĚƌĂǁƐĨƌŽŵ^ĂĨĞƌZĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇĚĂƚĂ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐǁŝƚŚ>ŽŶĚŽŶ-based 
stakeholders and interviews with tenants who have had direct experience of landlord and 
letting agent criminality. All research took place before March 2020. 
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2 Regulatory framework 
 
 
Regulation of the private rented sector is spread across a range of local authority officers, 
including environmental health professionals, tenancy relations officers, trading standards 
and planning.  
 
The regulatory framework includes a patchwork of regulations that offer tenant protection 
from eviction, controls on property standards and management, regulation of the letting 
agent industry and building control regulations which control areas such as changes in use 
class.  
 
Recent regulation has encouraged local authorities to make greater recourse to pursuing 
civil penalties from landlords.  
 
However, these regulations are piecemeal. They may deliver greater levels of compliance 
amongst already-compliant landlords in the mainstream market but offer little protection to 
tenants where landlords and agents choose to act illegally. 
 
 
3. Landlords and agents in the shadow PRS 
 
Defining landlord identities is a problem in the shadow PRS. Tenants may not be clear as to 
the status of the person to whom they are paying the rent: it could be the landlord, agent, 
or another tenant. Complex criminal cases sometimes include chains of landlords, agents 
ĂŶĚƚĞŶĂŶƚƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ‘ƌĞŶƚ-to-ƌĞŶƚ ?ƐĐĂŵƐ ?^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ?ĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŚĂŝŶŵĂǇďĞ
complicit; in other cases, just part of the chain might be operating with illegal intent.  
The use of letting agents appears to multiple opportunities for illegality.  
This report distinguishes five groupings or types of criminal landlord behaviours: 
x wilfully ignorant landlords who tended to have small portfolios and were letting with no 
intention of meeting their statutory obligations; 
x corner cutters had larger portfolios and maximised their rental income through non-
complicance, factoring penalties and fines into their business model; 
x scammers remained hidden, and often used the internet to swindle tenants  W and 
landlords  W through securing and then stealing deposits, or renting property that was 
immediately sublet or let on the short-let market; 
x prolific offenders showed a blatant disregard for the law, often acting unpleasantly and 
with impunity, and were confident about their ability to challenge any attempt at 
prosecution; and  
x letting linked to organised crime in which letting might be associated with labour and 
sex trafficking and the use of rented property as cannabis farms. 
Certain property management behaviours were strongly linked to illegality: 
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x a tendency to operate at the edges of tenancy law, where there could be ambiguity 
around tenant rights, for example, in rent-to-ƌĞŶƚƐĐĂŵƐ ? ‘ůŽĐŬĚŽǁŶ ?ƐƵďĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?
ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇŐƵĂƌĚŝĂŶƐŚŝƉ ? ‘ůŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞ ?ĐůƵďƐĂŶĚƐŚŽƌƚ-term lettings; 
x high density letting and serious overcrowding, including the use of structures  W shipping 
containers, sheds, garages  W not designed for residential purposes; 
x operating with no formal tenancy agreements and requiring tenants to pay cash with 
no rent book or receipts; 
x common use of illegal eviction, which could include  W in addition to the sudden loss of 
home  W theft or damage to property and some level of physical assault or threat. 
 
 
4. Tenant experiences of the shadow PRS 
 
The report ten individualƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ criminal landlord behaviour, and common themes 
emerged:  
 
x The involvement of the local authority did not deter criminal behaviour. Respondents 
reported that local authority enforcement actions did not materially change the 
ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?dĞŶĂŶƚƐǁŚŽŚĂĚůŽŽŬĞĚŽƌŚĞůƉĨĞůƚƵŶƉrotected by the statutory 
authorities. 
x Landlords or letting agents in the shadow PRS felt that they could act with impunity. 
Tenants were living with personal insecurity, theft, harassment and fraud. There was the 
constant threat of the worst outcome, which was the landlord illegally and with no 
notice changing the locks. Tenants felt they had no protection from the traumatic loss of 
home and possessions: police tended to side with the landlord. 
x Tenants could themselves be drawn or coerced into illegality through rent-to-rent 
scams. 
x Only six per cent of cases pursued by Safer Renting led to households gaining a social 
housing tenancy. In most cases, despite Safer Renting involvement, positive outcomes 
ĂŶĚƌĂƌĞůǇůĞĚƚŽĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶĂůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƐďĞŚĂviour. Tenants contined to 
move from one shadow PRS tenants to another where they had children or other 
vulnerable people in the household. 
 
 
5. Obstacles to enforcement and justice: stakeholder perspectives 
 
Principal obstacles to enforcement related to the complexity of regulations, the nature and 
scale of criminality in the private rented sector, and the subsequent inability of local 
authorities to respond effectively. Local authority offers were working with laws that left 
considerable ambiguities and which were not targeted at the kinds of criminality that were 
common in the PRS.  
 
In addition, there was a lack of consistency in political will at local and national levels to deal 
with the problem. Stakeholders alluded to degrees of complicity, where boroughs were 
unwilling to prosecute landlords they relied on to provide temporary accommodation and 
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meet low-income housing need, irrespective of the fact that sometimes the same landlords 
were routinely contravening multiple regulations.  
 
In addition, police were ambivalent about dealing with even serious crime that had a 
housing component. Local authority officers and housing law advisers had no confidence 
that the police were equipped to deal with landlord criminality or even willing to do so. 
Similarly, tenantƐ ? experiences described in this report would tend to cement their view that 
the police would offer no protection, even where the landlord was physically threatening or 
had stolen property.  
 
 
6. Recommendations  
 
The report makes eleven recommendations, for the government, local authorities, the 
Crown Prosecution Service and the Metropolitan Police Service.   
 
The Government should: 
x Place a duty (not just a power) on the police to enforce the provisions of the Protection 
from Eviction Act 1973. 
x Create a fund to support local authorities in recruiting expertise and capacity to pursue 
civil penalties under the Housing and Planning Act 2016. 
x Place a legal requirement on online platforms that host private rentals adverts to police 
criminal activity by disabling offending accounts and give clear advice on how private 
tenants can protect themselves from criminal landlord and letting agent behaviour. 
x Introduce a duty on local authorities to prepare local multi-agency strategic housing 
plans that include provisions for joint working that cover housing options, homelessness 
and regulation of the PRS, Planning, Trading Standards and policing to detect and 
ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐ ?ĂŶĚĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? 
x Amend housing legislation to introduce joint and several liability for housing offences to 
include the property owner. 
x Remove ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ‘EŽ&ĂƵůƚ ?ĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƐand replace Assured Shorthold Tenancies with 
longer, fixed-term tenancies, with a duty to on landlords to provide written tenancy 
agreements that comply with statutory requirements.  
x Introduce a right to expert statutory advocacy for private renters faced with criminal 
behaviour by landlords. 
 
 
Local authorities should: 
 
x Adopt targeted means to detect unlicensed HMOs, including expanding data-sharing 
and monitoring all on-line platforms advertising private rentals. 
x Work with the police more proactively to enforce the Protection from Eviction Act 
1977, and actively pursue prosecutions of offenders in such cases. 
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The Crown Prosecution Service should: 
 
x Institute procedures for centralising data collection and reporting on illegal evictions. 
 
 
The Metropolitan Police should: 
 
x Work with councils to make more active use of powers to enforce the Protection from 
Eviction Act 1977. 
x Review its training around evictions. 
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1 Context and method 
 
 
About the Safer Renting project 
 
This project has been undertaken by the Safer Renting Project based at Cambridge House, a 
South East London  ‘ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ‘ƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƵƌďĂŶ
poor and ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĨŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?1 Safer Renting, set up by Cambridge House in 2016, 
has the following four objectives:  
 
x To prevent homelessness, particularly by intervening in illegal evictions; 
x Support private renters to negotiate better conditions in their homes;  
x Enable private renters to leave a criminal landlord on their own terms, with 
compensation wherever possible; and 
x Inform government policy and best practice by analysing and communicating how 
criminal landlords are exploiting the London housing crisis at the expense of tenants. 
 
The Safer Renting team has extensive experience in working in tenancy rights and working 
with local authority housing enforcement teams. The team works closely with the 
Cambridge House Housing Law Centre. The team works with six London boroughs: Croydon, 
Enfield, Hounslow, Lewisham, Westminster and Waltham Forest, and undertakes close to 
200 cases a year.  
 
 
Rationale for the research  
 
The Safer Renting team is routinely familiar with a part of the private rented sector (PRS) 
not represented in official statistics. The English Housing Survey (EHS) indicates that 84 per 
cent of tenants are satisfied with their rental property, but it is highly unlikely that EHS 
surveyors encounter the kinds of rental arrangement discussed in this report.  
 
dŚŝƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂůƐŽŽĨĨĞƌƐƐŽŵĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶĚĞďĂƚĞƐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ƌŽŐƵĞ ?
landlordism. Arguments are often made that landlords cannot be expected to keep up to 
speed with overly complex housing law. Certainly, where offences are committed in 
ignorance then more resources need to be directed towards education and training. 
However, there are parts of the market where offences are perpetrated knowingly. In these 
cases, a greater emphasis needs to be placed on detection, prosecution and penalties that 
would constitute an adequate deterrent.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 https://ch1889.org/our-story 
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Criminal landlords and the  ‘shadow ?WZ ^
 
The ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƌĞŶƚĞĚƐĞĐƚŽƌŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐǁŚĂƚŝƐŚĞƌĞƚĞƌŵĞĚĂ ‘ƐŚĂĚŽǁ ?ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐ
particular characteristics. Tenants in this part of the market may already be vulnerable to 
harm as a consequence of low income and marginality in the labour market. Many 
mainstream landlords prefer not to let to tenants who are dependent on welfare, and this 
means that these households are often unable to exercise choice. Tenants in the shadow 
PRS are more likely to be economic migrants and their unfamiliarity with the UK housing 
markets often makes them uncertain about exercising their housing rights. Landlords and 
letting agents in the shadow PRS deliberately target the most vulnerable tenants, and 
consciously undertake multiple breaches of tenancy and housing law in order to maximise 
their rental profit. 
  
Behaviours in the shadow PRS have tended to evade routine survey data collection, and this 
part of the market is not well understood. The English Housing Survey is based on face-to-
face interviews with resident households.
2
 In the shadow PRS, households are unlikely to 
make themselves available for interview, may not have English as a first language, and will 
often be living in shared properties. Landlords aiming to mask the degree of overcrowding 
and poor property conditions might well threaten their tenants away from speaking to 
officials. Where tenants are migrants, landlords might claim that speaking to officials would 
risk Home Office deportation.  
 
In addition, the shadow PRS also includes letting practices that tend not to fit conventional 
tenancy definitions. Letting arrangements and the property itself might well alter and shift 
through the course of a tenancy. Family accommodation might be subdivided once a 
tenancy has started; unrelated people may well be expected to share rooms; and at the 
ďŽƚƚŽŵŽĨƚŚĞƐĐĂůĞ ?ƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚŵĂǇŚĂǀĞƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĚŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂ ‘ďĞĚ-ƐŚŝĨƚ ? ?ŽƌĂďĞĚ
shared with another shift worker.  
 
The research will refer to the activities of landlords and letting agents ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƌŽŐƵĞ
ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƵƐĞĚƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůwho is letting property in contravention of the 
law. This term came into common usage from around 2010, and was adopted in 2012 by the 
ƚŚĞŶĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĨŽƌŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚ>ŽĐĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶŝƚƐ ‘ĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚZŽŐƵĞ
>ĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐ P'ƵŝĚĞĨŽƌ>ŽĐĂůƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?dŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƌĂŝƐĞĚawareness of contraventions in 
the residential market and use of the term has since gained widespread acceptance in 
government, across the media and with the public. However, this term is not useful, and 
tends to cover all landlords who fail to honour their legal obligations, whether through 
ignorance, negligence or active criminal intent. 
 
The narrative surrounding housing crime suggests that these practices are in some way less 
than criminal. An industry spokesperson commented that whether landlords were acting in 
ignorance, through negligence or with deliberate intent,  ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐƵŶĚĞƌĐƌŝŵŝŶĂl law  W ŝƚ ?Ɛ
ŶŽƚǁŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞǁŽƵůĚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĂƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƚǇ ?.3  
 
                                                          
2
 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/english-housing-survey-guidance-and-methodology 
3
 Industry stakeholder #3 
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This report reflects on over 180 cases undertaken over the past two years, and it was 
common to encounter landlords who expressed complete disregard for tenancy rights law, 
claiming that they ǁĞƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽĚŽǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘their property ? ?
 
This report is concerned specifically with this ŐƌŽƵƉ ?ĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂƐĂ ‘ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ?ĐĂŶ
only follow where that individual has been convicted of a criminal offence. This report refers 
to  ‘criminal landlords ?as those who wilfully breach housing and other related consumer 
legislation, irrespective of whether they have been convicted of those offences. These 
landlords have made a strategic decision to target vulnerable tenants who may not be 
capable of asserting their rights, and knowingly execute multiple breaches of housing, 
landlord and tenant, health and safety and Trading Standards law for the purpose of 
increasing their rental profit.  
 
This report places an important stress on criminal intent. Policy debate has shown a great 
ĚĞĂůŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŵĂŬŝŶŐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ‘ƚǇƉĞƐ ?ŽĨůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ
according to whether they are knowingly breaking the law, and the seriousness and 
frequency of their offending behaviour. Criminal landlords exist as a group that can be 
distinguished from individual landlords who are simply not well versed in housing law. 
 ‘ŵĂƚĞƵƌ ? landlords are generally well-meaning and require a specific kind of policy 
intervention that raises awareness and expands training opportunities. More strategic and 
intentional criminality in the lettings market requires a different response, with an emphasis 
on detection, prosecution and effective penalties.  
 
It is evident that letting agents can also be involved in the shadow market, often involving 
some level of fraud with regard to deposit holding or rent collection. Landlords are 
sometimes complicit in this fraudulent activity. It is also the case that landlords may be 
completely unaware that their lettinŐĂŐĞŶƚŝƐĂĐƚŝŶŐŝůůĞŐĂůůǇ ?dŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ƌĞŶƚ-to-
ƌĞŶƚ ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐĂŶĐƌĞĂƚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶĂƐƐŝŐŶŝŶŐĐƵůƉĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶƐŽŵĞƚǇƉĞƐ
of typical shadow market behaviour.   
 
 
Context 
 
In recent years, a number of factors in the context have allowed this shadow market to 
flourish. 
Financial incentives 
The sector can be remarkably remunerative and demand for rental property is strong. In 
2017, Knight Frank stated that the PRS had in that year secured £6.3 billion in investments.
4
 
Countrywide, BriƚĂŝŶ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂŐĞŶƚ ?ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐŚĂĚƉĂŝĚŽǀĞƌ
£51.6bn in rents, compared to £22.6bn in 2007.
5
 London is a particularly valuable market. 
According to the EHS, the median rent for PRS property in the capital 2017/18 was £1,352 a 
month, compared with £684 for the rest of England.
6
  
 
                                                          
4
 Matthews, W. and Elliott, L. (2018) The Human Factor: Specialist Property, London: Frank Knight. 
5
 ŽůůŝƐŽŶ ?W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘h<ƚĞŶĂŶƚƐƉĂŝĚƌĞĐŽƌĚ ? ? ?ďŶŝŶƌĞŶƚƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?Guardian, 12 Feb. 
6
 English Housing Survey Headline Report, Annex Table 1.12.   
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Subdivision increases the profitability of a property and there is a strong market for shared 
lettings in London. The extent to which this reflects preference for shared living and to what 
extent it reflects diminishing affordability of rents is moot. Further, the existence of a 
shadow PRS relies on there being demand from groups facing difficulties in accessing the 
mainstream, open market. Landlord and letting agent unwillingness to deal with tenants in 
receipt of benefits ĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƌĞŶƚ ?ĐŚĞĐŬƐhas pushed demand to parts of the 
market in which criminal activity is more likely to take place.  
 
Ethnic enclaves and language barriers  
London is a place where cultures and languages exist in parallel, sometimes very separately. 
The PRS is a first home for the vast majority of migrants to the UK, who are vulnerable to 
exploitation by landlords running or connected to illegal labour gangs, and who may well 
have encouraged or facilitated the move to the UK. The ethnic and language dimension 
means that victims of criminal landlordism can become isolated or  W conversely  W supported 
by a migrant community network that is not necessarily well acquainted with tenancy law.  
 
Cutbacks in enforcement funding 
Substantial regulation defines standards for property management and condition, but 
austerity measures in local government have resulted in a continuous round of disruptive 
staff re-organisations that have reduced resources and de-skilled officers with a 
responsibility for enforcement. Central government funding cuts have reduced local 
government spending on a raft of services that together form the framework for regulating 
the PRS: between 2009/10 and 2017/18, there were cuts of over 50 per cent in housing and 
planning expenditure, and a cut of nearly 20 per cent in spending on environmental 
services, including environmental health, which holds primary responsibility for PRS 
enforcement. 
7
  
 
Complex legislation 
The legal framework for enforcement requires engagement with unwieldy bureaucracy and 
complex and often contradictory legislation. At least 29 statutes are in force, applied by four 
distinct professional disciplines including Environmental Health Professionals (EHPs), 
Tenancy Relations Officers (TROs), Trading Standards Officers (TSOs) and planning officers. 
Amongst other things, these officers enforce regulations relating to:  
 
x mandatory and selective licensing of various type of property;  
x setting minimum property standards for licensing schemes and applying the Housing 
Health and Safety Rating System where required to make an inspection; 
x ŵŝŶŝŵƵŵŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨŽǀĞƌĐƌŽǁĚŝŶŐĂŶĚ ‘&ŝƚĂŶĚ
WƌŽƉĞƌ ?ƚĞƐƚƐĨŽƌůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐůĞƚƚŝŶŐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇƉĞƐŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? 
x illegal eviction;  
x contravention of regulations around tenant fees, the handling of deposits and issuing 
unfair tenancy contracts; and 
x building controls. 
 
                                                          
7
 MHCLG Select Committee ( ? ? ? ? ? “>ŽĐĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?^ƉĞŶĚŝŶŐZĞǀŝĞǁ ? 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcomloc/2036/203605.htm 
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However, enforcement activities are not always well co-ordinated. Local authorities may 
waste time and effort in pursing multiple enforcement actions against the same landlord 
and waste resources in not using the most effective regulatory option. Lack of clarity on 
where responsibility lies within the local authority creates difficulties for tenants seeking 
support for dealing with a problematic landlord.
8
  
 
Reduced access to legal recourse 
Law centre closures and loss of legal aid housing solicitors have further reduced resources 
and skills to support tenants in bringing their own action against landlords operating 
illegally. Further, twenty of the courts (County and Magistrates) that hear housing claims 
have been closed across London, which has substantially reduced the accessibility of 
housing justice.
9
 Freedom of Information requests collating data on enforcement action 
have indicated very low levels of prosecution of criminal landlords.
 10
 This indicates that the 
civil penalty threats included within the Housing and Planning Act 2016 have had limited 
traction to date.  
 
Growth in online lettings 
Growing reliance on the internet to advertise and arrange tenancies has created new 
opportunities for fraudulent activity particularly with regard to the advertisement of rooms 
in shared properties on sites including Gumtree and SpareRoom. It is more difficult to bring 
actions against agents and landlords operating entirely online: perpetrators evade scrutiny 
through identity fraud and property companies dissolving to evade detection but setting up 
ĂŐĂŝŶŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƵŶĚĞƌĂŶĞǁŶĂŵĞ ? ‘ƉŚŽĞŶŝǆŝŶŐ ?).   
 
 
Existing literature and evidence 
 
Despite substantial anecdotal evidence of criminal behaviour in the PRS, no research has 
focussed entirely on this phenomenon although aspects of poor letting practice have been 
highlighted in individual reports. In 2017, Clarke et al. published a study exploring the 
incidence and geography of enforced moves from rental property, including social 
tenancies. The report isolated the practice of illegal eviction, landlord intimidation and 
enforced moves in the PRS but did not quantify the problem or draw any conclusions 
relating to criminality in the market.
11
 Lobbying on issues relating to private renting is more 
likely to make reference to affordability issues, property conditions and the role of the 
sector in accommodating households not necessarily suited to private renting.
12
 
 
A lack of engagement with this issue is reflective of problems with counting the incidence of 
particular types of criminal activity. For example, no data is held by the Crown Prosecution 
Service on the incidence of prosecutions of landlords or letting agents for fraud, despite the 
                                                          
8
 ZƵŐŐ ?: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “>ŽŶĚŽŶŽƌŽƵŐŚƐ ?DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞWƌŝǀĂƚĞZĞŶƚĞĚ^ĞĐƚŽƌ ? 
9
 DĂĚŐĞ ?E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “^ĞůůŝŶŐKĨĨKƵƌ^ŝůǀĞƌ ?Legal Action Group, July 2019 
https://www.lag.org.uk/article/206681/selling-off-our-silver 
10
 Battersby, S. (2017) Local Authority Housing Action on Conditions in Rented Housing. www.sabattersby.co.uk 
11
 Clarke, A., Hamilton, C., Jones, M. and Muir, K. (2017) Poverty, Eviction and Enforced Moves, York: JRF. 
12
 For an overview of recent literature see Rugg, J. and Rhodes, D. (2018) The Evolving Private Rented Sector: 
Its Contribution and Potential, York: Centre for Housing Policy.    
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,ŽŵĞKĨĨŝĐĞ ?'> ?ƐZŽŐƵĞ>ĂŶĚůŽƌĚŚĞĐŬĞƌůŝƐƚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŬĞǇŽĨĨĞŶĐĞƐ ?/Ŷ
addition, there is no method for monitoring the incidence of illegal eviction since these 
cases rarely lead to formal action against the landlord by the tenant.  
 
Nevertheless, it is very clear that landlord crime is not unusual. In 2016, Citizens Advice 
reported that in the twelve months up to March 2106, 2,087 people had asked for advice 
after being threatened with illegal eviction. This was an increase of nearly 50 per cent from 
1,415 for the previous year.
13
 A Shelter Yougov poll of 3,250 tenants in 2016 indicated that 
one in eight had experienced some level of landlord illegality. Actions included landlords 
who had cut off their tĞŶĂŶƚ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐ, changed locks and thrown out tenant possessions, 
been abusive or threatening, ĂŶĚĞŶƚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ŚŽŵĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽƌŶŽƚŝĐĞ ?14 
 
Despite the availability of this information, there is little sense in which criminality in the 
PRS is regarded as a major issue, particularly by the police. The last major report in this area 
was commissioned by the then DETR in 2000: copies are no longer available.
15
 In 2015, the 
Police Federation produced a report that focussed on crime as it related to the PRS, but the 
report was extremely limited in scope, and only considered the incidence of burglary and 
anti-social behaviour in rental property.
16
 The Mayor of London has intervened in 
establishing a Rogue Landlord checker database, but without substantive evidence, it is 
clear that there will continue to be limited policing interest.  
 
 
Research methods 
 
The research set out to explore four inter-related areas:  
 
x The characteristics the shadow PRS; 
x Typical behaviours of landlords and letting agents operating in the shadow PRS; 
x dĞŶĂŶƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐĂŶĚůĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ 
x Obstacles to an effective regulatory response.  
 
The report uses data obtained from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods 
including: 
 
x Analysis of Safer Renting case study data; 
x Face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with stakeholders representing local 
authorities, elected representatives, and the legal profession; and 
                                                          
13
 CitizeŶƐĚǀŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? “ůŵŽƐƚ ? ?A?ŵŽƌĞƉĞŽƉůĞĨĂĐŝŶŐĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ ŚĞůĂƐƚǇĞĂƌ ? ?
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-us/how-citizens-advice-works/media/press-releases/almost-50-
more-people-facing-illegal-eviction-in-the-last-year/ 
14
 ^ŚĞůƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? “Over a million renters victim to law-breaking landlords ?
https://england.shelter.org.uk/media/press_releases/articles/over_a_million_renters_victim_to_law-
breaking_landlords2 
15
 D.S. Cowan, A. Marsh, P. Niner, R. Kennett, R. Forrest (2000) Harassment and unlawful eviction of private 
rented sector tenants and park home residents, London: DETR. 
16
 A. Higgins and R. Jarman (2015) Safe as Houses: Crime and Changing Tenure Patterns, London: The Police 
Federation. 
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x  Face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with tenants who have experienced criminal 
landlord behaviour. 
 
All interviews were recorded, and this report includes verbatim quotations  W checked by 
respondents  W distinguished in the text by use of italics. 
 
Analysis of Safer Renting case study data 
Each year, Safer Renting supports just under 200 private tenants faced with often complex 
legal housing problems. The project has a contractual agreement to accept referrals from 
Waltham Forest, Hounslow, Enfield, Havering, Westminster City Council and Croydon 
Citizens Advice. Staff also work closely with stakeholders across London such as the police 
ĂŶĚůĂǁǇĞƌƐƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ? 
 
dŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚŝƐŝŶƉĂƌƚĂƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ĂĨĞƌZĞŶƚŝŶŐƚĞĂŵ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ
tenants in the shadow PRS. The team has undertaken all the primary research in this report, 
framing the interview questions around their detailed understanding of criminal landlord 
practices, tenant experiences and the response of various regulatory authorities to the 
incidence of criminality.  
 
In addition, Safer Renting has created a database of 259 cases pursued between January 
2018 and March 2020. Demographic data on tenants in these cases indicates that: 
 
x  ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨĐĂƐĞƐǁĞƌĞD ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚǁĞƌĞǁŚŝƚĞ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƚǁŽ
thirds were Eastern European); 17 per cent white British and 1 per cent other;  
x 47 per cent were single-person household in house shares; 27 per cent were families 
with dependent children (half of these were lone parents); 11 per cent were single 
people, and 8 per cent were couples in non-sharing accommodation; 4 per cent were 
adult multi-ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƐĂŶĚ ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚǁĞƌĞ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ĂŶĚ 
x Income data collected from one fifth of this sample (52 cases) indicates that close to two 
thirds were in work. A half of this working group received in-work benefits. 
 
Stakeholder interviews 
Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews took place with twelve professional stakeholders 
ǁŚŽǁĞƌĞƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĞĚĨƌŽŵ^ĂĨĞƌZĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?ƐŽǁŶƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŶĞƚǁŽƌŬǁŚŝĐŚĞǆƚĞŶĚƐ
throughout the capital. All the stakeholders had expertise and resources, duties and/or 
powers that are relevant to the policing, enforcement of standards and landlord prosecution 
in London. The interviewees included:  
 
x Three inner and outer London Environmental Health Professionals;   
x Four specialists in housing law; 
x Two constituency teams of London MPs with a particular interest in housing and a 
Greater London Assembly member; 
x A representative from the Greater London Authority with specialism in policing and 
crime; and 
x A third sector housing advice worker; and a local authority housing advice worker.   
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In addition, interviews also took place with one landlord representative, one letting agent 
representative one Property Redress Scheme representative, and a representative from an 
online property portal.  
 
Extensive attempts were made to speak with a representative from the Metropolitan Police 
Service but there was no response to multiple requests. 
 
The interviews ĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨthe different types of criminal 
behaviour that they routinely encountered in their professional capacity, whether it was 
possible to characterise tenants who were victims of this kind of behaviour, and examined 
the issues attached to enforcement and prosecution. Findings from these interviews are 
referred to throughout the report, and particularly in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Stakeholder 
respondents will not be identified by name in this report.  
 
Tenant interviews 
The Safer Renting team recruited respondents from their caseload, following a clear  ‘ŽƉƚ-ŝŶ ?
protocol which included the securing of informed consent and assurances of confidentiality. 
A total of 31 tenants agreed to a face-to-face interview, which took place using a semi-
structured topic guide to help the interviewee create a detailed narrative of their housing 
experience.  
 
 
Report structure 
 
This report will, in Chapter 2, discuss the legal framework for private renting and indicates 
the problems for officers in different departments working across multiple and sometimes 
contradictory laws. Chapter 3 uses stakeholder and tenant information to characterise 
common criminal landlord behaviours, and Chapter 4 gives a detailed narration of the 
experiences of a selection of the tenants who were interviewed.   Chapter 5 outlines the 
obstacles to effective enforcement and to successful prosecution of criminal landlords. The 
final chapter outlines recommendations.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Legislation defines landlord criminal behaviour but little attention has been paid to the 
incidence of crimes relating to the letting of residential property. This research highlights 
the very serious nature of those crimes: in the  ‘ƐŚĂĚŽǁ ? private rented sector, tenants are 
subject to financial exploitation, harassment, illegal eviction, theft of their property, threats 
of violence and actual violence. ŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐŝŶŐůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐĂƐ ‘ƌŽŐƵĞƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ
underplays the challenges faced by housing professionals seeking to enforce regulations and 
secure prosecution against landlords who set out to act in an intentionally criminal way.  
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2. The regulatory framework 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This report is not the place for a full description of the regulatory framework for the PRS 
although it is important to highlight the sheer breadth and complexity of that framework. 
Different professional disciplines are called on to implement the law, which means that 
problems arise for local authority officers deciding between possible regulatory responses. 
As will be seen in Chapter 3, shadow PRS landlords and letting agents are often guilty of 
multiple offences. Moreover, there is a constant risk of breakdown in co-ordination 
between the various professional disciplines. Landlords and letting agents are able to exploit 
gaps and contradictions in the law, and tenants  W understandably  W often lack a clear 
understanding of their rights. For these reasons, many observers have called on the 
government to undertake a radical review to consolidate rental legislation. The scale of 
problems is indicated by the fact that PRS law comprises at least 29 separate statutes with 
their associated regulations, enforced by six distinct professional disciplines at the local 
level.  
 
This current chapter outlines the principal statutes which are often breached in the shadow 
PRS, and will consider, specifically: duties relating to protection from eviction; property and 
management standards; regulations relating to letting agents; and planning regulations. 
Breaching these regulations is often a civil rather than a criminal matter, though in some 
important cases, such as Protection from Eviction, the offences are both civil and criminal. 
This particularly creates uncertainty as to police involvement in prosecution. The final 
section of the chapter briefly outlines the process of taking an offender to court.  
 
 
Local authority statutory duties 
 
It should first be stressed that local authority activity is defined by statute. There are over 
1,000 statutory requirements which local authorities are obliged to observe. These 
requirements include, for example, undertaking periodic housing needs and homelessness 
surveys. There is also a requirement to license houses in multiple occupation above a 
certain number of occupants. However, other types of activity are not statutory 
requirements, irrespective of their desirability: for example, local authorities are not obliged 
to investigate an illegal eviction. All local authorities must comply with their statutory 
duties, but the ability to take other actions which offer essential support to the undertaking 
of statutory responsibilities have often been compromised by budget cuts (see Chapter 5). 
 
 
Protection from eviction 
 
Protection from Eviction Act 1977 
As will be seen in Chapter 3, landlords and letting agents operating in the shadow PRS are 
most likely to be in breach of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. This Act defines 
18 
 
unlawful eviction and harassment. Legalities with regard to eviction depend on the way in 
which a tenant occupies a property. Private tenants rent on a variety of forms of tenancy, 
each with their own rights and obligations. The overwhelming majority of private tenants 
are Assured Shorthold Tenants (AST), or statutory periodic tenants renting on the same 
terms as their initial AST, or tenants who have no form of written tenancy agreement. In the 
latter case, proof of exclusive occupation and payment of rent for the home (whether a 
room or a whole house) can be used to argue that the occupant does indeed have an AST.
17
 
 
Landlords seeking to evict tenants on an AST must comply with the procedures set out in 
the Housing Act 1988. This act defines seventeen grounds for possession, including a series 
of grounds relating to arrears of rent and another for other breaches of tenancy conditions. 
However the most commonly used ground is the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŶŽĨĂƵůƚĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?Žƌ ‘^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?
(S21) to which there is often no defence. A successful possession claim requires only that 
the landlord prove that they have abided by their statutory obligations, such as property 
licensing, observance of fire and gas safety measures, rent deposit protection and that they 
have not recently been subject to Improvement notices by the local authority. 
 
To end a tenancy and most licenses, a landlord must follow a formal procedure. Landlords 
ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƵƐĞĂ^ ? ? ‘ŶŽĨĂƵůƚ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ, by which they: 
 
x serve a S21 Notice of Seeking Possession to the tenant, normally18 ŐŝǀŝŶŐƚǁŽŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?
notice; 
x if a tenant stays after that date, the landlord can apply to court for an order for 
ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƐŝǆŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?of serving of the S21; 
x court papers sent to the tenant give the opportunity to challenge the S21 notice or ask 
for more time; 
x if the landlord is not seeking repayment of arrears and no defence has been entered by 
the tenant, an accelerated order means that no court hearing is required; and 
x if the tenant is still in the property, court bailiffs will issue a time/date for an eviction. 
Only bailiffs can execute an eviction order.  
 
Overall, the entire process from ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŽĨĂŶŽƚŝĐĞƚŽƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶďǇďĂŝůŝĨĨ ?ƐǁĂƌƌĂŶƚŝƐ
typically a minimum of 9 months. Currently, the government is considering a further 
ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŽůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞ^ ? ? ‘ŶŽĨĂƵůƚ ?ĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŝƐ
strongly committed to this procedure being retained, as it is relatively simple and less costly 
than proving fault on the tenant ?Ɛ part.  
 
The Protection from Eviction Act 1977 provides that tenants may not be evicted from their 
home without a court order. Where a landlord has resorted to eviction by force or by 
changing the locks while the tenant is out, it is a criminal offence in which: 
 
x police may intervene and arrest the landlord; 
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 Street V. Mountford (1986) and s54 Law of Property Act 1925. 
18
 These procedures relate to usual practice outside the emergency procedures introduced under the Covid-19 
outbreak. 
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x the tenant has a right under the Criminal Law Act 1977 Section 6 to use reasonable force 
to re-enter the property; 
x a local authority can bring a criminal prosecution after the event, leading to a fine or 
imprisonment; 
x the tenant may bring a civil claim for damages; and 
x the tenant or the local authority can apply for a Rent Repayment Order. 
 
The Protection from Eviction Act does not apply where the occupant is deemed to have the 
lessĞƌƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨĂ ‘ůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƚĞŶĂŶƚ ?ŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨĂŶǇǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?dŚŝƐ
is where the occupant:  
 
x ƐŚĂƌĞƐůŝǀŝŶŐĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?Ɛ
family) and the landlord or family member has lived there from before the occupant 
moved in, and has lived there continuously up until and including when Notice to Quit is 
served and 
x the room(s) exclusively occupied have changed during the course of the occupancy: a 
change of location in a house during the period of occupation say from Room A to Room 
B - would mean that what might otherwise be a tenancy becomes a licence, with lesser 
security of tenure. 
 
As will be seen in Chapter 3, landlords or letting agents sometimes leave the legal status of a 
tenant deliberately opaque in order to create uncertainty as to the applicability of 
safeguards provided by the Protection from Eviction Act. 
 
This Act also anticipates that landlords may well undertake harassment or other types of 
activity in order to induce the tenant to forgo their tenancy. To this end, the Act also defines 
as an offence any action  ‘ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞ with the peace or comfort of the residential 
ŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƌŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨŚŝƐŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚ ?; this action can include the withdrawal or 
withholding of services  ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ
as a residence ?.  
 
Landlords in breach of the Protection from Eviction Act may be subject to criminal 
prosecution, and if convicted may be subject to a fine and/or a term of imprisonment. 
Under the Protection from Eviction Act, both the police and local authorities have the power 
to prosecute a landlord for harassment or illegal eviction. Police forces have generally 
deferred to the local authority to exercise that power. Historically, local authorities 
employed Tenancy Relations Officers (TROs), usually within housing needs teams, to provide 
advice and sometimes advocacy for tenants and prepare witness evidence for a prosecution 
ďƌŽƵŐŚƚďǇƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ƐůĞŐĂůƚĞĂŵ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽf TROs employed by local 
authorities has declined substantially (see Chapter 5).  
 
Deregulation Act 2015 
In an attempt to combat the incidence and fear of retaliatory eviction, whereby a landlord 
will respond to a request for repairs by serving an eviction notice, the Deregulation Act 2015 
set out restrictions on the ability of landlords to serve an eviction notice within six months 
of being served an improvement order by the local authority. The Act requires the tenant to 
contact the local authority to secure an inspection, and for the local authority to deliver an 
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improvement notice formally before the landlord takes the opportunity to serve an eviction 
notice. It is uncertain how much use has so far been made of the Deregulation Act to 
counter the incidence of retaliatory eviction, which in any case offers little protection to 
tenants in the shadow PRS. As will be seen in the following chapters, eviction is not 
necessarily associated with complaints about property conditions and there is often little 
intention on the part of the landlord to evict using any form of legal procedure.  
 
 
Property and management standards 
 
Local authority Environmental Health Professionals (EHPs) working in Enforcement and 
Licensing Teams are the chief agencies for enforcing standards in private rented housing. 
EHP powers are derived from 15 of the 20 key statutes. The following sections include 
principal elements of their responsibilities. 
 
Mandatory licensing of Houses in Multiple Occupation 
The Housing Act 2004 introduced a suite of licensing options for local authorities to regulate 
the physical and amenity conditions, layout and management standards, including 
mandatory licensing for all properties falling under its definition of house in multiple 
occupation (HMO). This definition was expanded in 2018 to include any property let 
privately to five or more individuals (including children) in two or more unrelated 
households, irrespective of the storey height of the property. Landlords are obliged to 
license all property defined as HMOs within their local authority. A failure to do so can lead 
to prosecution and a civil penalty fine. It can also allow the local authority to impose an 
Interim or Final Management Order on the property, in which the local authority steps in 
and takes ŽŶƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚĚƵƚŝĞƐƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?DƵůƚŝƉůĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐƚŽ
license can also give rise to a maximum one year banning order, which essentially prohibits 
an individual from operating as a landlord or letting agent. 
 
 ‘ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?Žƌ ‘^ĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ůŝĐĞŶĐŝŶŐ 
Alongside the national Mandatory scheme, the Housing Act 2004 gives local authorities the 
ŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ ‘ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?Žƌ ‘^ĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ůŝĐĞŶĐŝŶŐ ?dŚĞƐĞƐĐŚĞŵĞƐĞǆƚĞŶĚƚŚĞscope 
of the mandatory licensing scheme to include all rented property of a particular type in a 
particular geographic locality. These schemes must be shown to meet nationally set tests of 
reasonableness, and require public consultation and government authorisation before they 
can be introduced. The schemes last for up to five years but may be extended at the end of 
the term if the justification for doing so is accepted. 
  
The Housing Health and Safety Rating System 
The Housing Act 2004 also introduced application of the Housing Health and Safety Rating 
System (HHSRS) to assess minimum property and fitness standards, and is backed with a 
power to apply Improvement Orders, Prohibition Orders or Management Orders for non-
compliance. HHSRS is the evaluation tool used by EHPs to assess the safety of a property 
during the course of an inspection. Some local authorities include inspection as part of their 
licensing regime, but this is not a general statutory requirement and is not always the case. 
Tenants may also ask local authorities to inspect their property if they feel that it is unsafe. 
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However, HHSRS does not define a standard that landlords must comply with in order to let 
property.  
 
On inspecting a property, officers must take action if they recognise the existence of hazards 
ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂƌƌŝĞƐĂŶ immediate threat to health and safety. This action 
can include informal negotiation with the landlord to make improvements or the serving of 
a formal notice to undertake the required repair. In cases of serious hazard, the local 
authority may serve an improvement notice which defines an action and a timescale for 
compliance. Landlords who have been served an improvement notice are unable to use a 
S21 eviction order for a period of at least six months after it has been complied with.   
 
Whilst such notices can be appealed against, it is an offence to fail to comply with an 
improvement notice without reasonable excuse and the local authority may do the work in 
default or by agreement. Since 6 April 2017, a local authority can impose a civil penalty of 
up to £30,000 as an alternative to prosecution. Landlords committing such an offence may 
also be subject to a Rent Repayment Order or a banning order. 
 
Amenities safety 
The Gas Safety Regulations 1998 created a duty for landlords to maintain annual gas safety 
certification. The Housing Act 2004 linked this duty as an explicit licensing requirement: all 
mandatory licenced HMOs must have a gas safety certificate. The Deregulation Act 2015 
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂŐĂƐƐĂĨĞƚǇĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞ
provided at the start of a tenancy in order to succeed with any S21 possession proceedings.  
 
Public Health Acts 1936 and 1961  
Two key acts provide local authorities with powers relating to amongst other things, the 
supply of clean water and drainage and sewers, to protect the health of occupants and the 
ǁŝĚĞƌĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĐƚŚĂƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĚĞĂůŝŶŐĂůƐŽǁŝƚŚ ‘ĨŝůƚŚǇĂŶĚǀĞƌŵŝŶŽƵƐ ?
properties. These powers are particularly relevant to the enforcement of standards in poorly 
converted properties, whether S25 ?,DKƐ ?ƐĞĞďĞůŽǁ ?ŽƌŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? ‘ďĞĚƐŝŶ
ƐŚĞĚƐ ? ?, where utilities have not been altered to provide for the new arrangements in the 
property. This can include problems arising, for example, from failure to properly separate 
waste water and foul waste, or meeting the standard for supply of fresh mains water. 
 
The powers contained in these acts include powers of entry, powers to undertake works in 
default and powers to prosecute owners not complying with notices. Building Control, 
Planning Enforcement and Licensing and Enforcement teams can all exercise powers under 
the Acts to order improvements. 
 
The Homes (Fitness for Human Habitation) Act 2018 
dŚŝƐĐƚĐĂŵĞŝŶƚŽĨŽƌĐĞŝŶDĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ?ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůƌĞŶƚĞĚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐĂƌĞ ‘Ĩŝƚ
for human hĂďŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐƐĂĨĞ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚǇĂŶĚĨƌĞĞĨƌŽŵĂŶǇƌŝƐŬŽĨƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ
harm. This Act empowers tenants themselves to take action against landlords with respect 
to property quality where unfitness was a feature of the original construction of the building 
rather than a problem of disrepair. If convicted in court, the court can oblige the landlord to 
pay compensation to the tenant. At the time of writing, the use and impact of this 
legislation was not yet evident. 
22 
 
 
Minimum management standards  
The Housing Act 2004 defines a range of minimum management standards for houses in 
multiple occupation and these standards are enforceable by local authority licensing and 
enforcement teams. The chief standards are as follows. 
 
Overcrowding 
For the purposes of enforcement in the PRS, two Housing Acts provide for the control of 
overcrowding. The Housing Act 1985 defines statutory overcrowding which can lead to 
criminal prosecutions if a room standard or space standard is not met.  For non-licensable 
property, the standard allows any number of people of the same sex to live in the same 
room, subject to 'the space standard'. The space standard sets the maximum number of 
people who may sleep in a property, according to size of the room, number of living rooms 
and bedrooms, and the age of the occupants. The room standard is breached when two 
people of the opposite sex sleep in the same room. The exceptions to this rule are 
cohabiting or married couples and children under the age of ten. Under the Housing Act 
1985, all living rooms and bedrooms and large kitchens are treated as a room.  
 
The Housing Act 2004 defines maximum occupancy rates for the numbers of people 
sleeping in houses in multiple occupation (whether mandatory or a local discretionary 
scheme) which are set out in the applicable licensing standard. It allows not only for the 
numbers of people sleeping in the property to be limited by reference to the space and ratio 
of people to utilities but also for rooms to be prohibited for sleeping purposes  W for example 
if they lack a safe means of escape in case of fire. 
 
From 1 October 2018 HMOs licensed in England under part 2 of the Housing Act 2004 had to 
have a floor area no-smaller than 6.51 square metres.  Licenses now require the floor area 
of: 
x any room in the HMO used as sleeping accommodation by one person aged over 10 
years is not less than 6.51 square metres; 
x any room in the HMO used as sleeping accommodation by two persons aged over 10 
years is not less than 10.22 square metres; 
x any room in the HMO used as sleeping accommodation by one person aged under 10 
years is not less than 4.64 square metres;  
 
and that any room in the HMO with a floor area of less than 4.64 square metres is not used 
as sleeping accommodation. 
 
In cases of overcrowding, EHOs have the power to bring a criminal prosecution or impose a 
£2,500 civil fine. If overcrowding existed at the time of the original letting and not as a result 
of subsequent natural household growth then an overcrowding notice stipulating the 
required reduction in occupancy level and a time frame by which it must be complied with 
may be served by the authority. To let or re-let rooms in such a way as to not reduce 
occupancy in line with a notice would be a criminal offence. The notice does not give a 
landlord rights to terminate a tenancy or evict occupants. 
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Deposit protection 
As required by the Housing Act 2004, landlords who let on an assured shorthold tenancy 
(AST) after 6 April 2007 are given  ? ?ĚĂǇƐƚŽƉůĂĐĞĂƚĞŶĂŶƚ ?Ɛdeposit in one of three 
government-backed tenancy deposit protection (TDP) schemes. The schemes safeguard and 
ultimately return the deposit to the tenant provided they meet the terms of the tenancy 
agreement.  Under the Deregulation Acts of 2015 and 2018, a landlord who fails to protect a 
rent deposit ŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇŝƐŶŽƚĂďůĞƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽĨĂƵůƚ ?ĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?^ ? ? ?ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĨŽƌĞǀŝĐƚŝŶŐ
a tenant, unless and until the deposit has either been protected or repaid in full. It also 
allows an aggrieved tenant to apply to county court for repayment of the deposit, plus a 
penalty payment of up to three times the value of the deposit.  
 
Rent collection and written tenancy agreements 
The regulations do not stipulate that landlords provide receipts for rent collected or  W unless 
served with a formal notice  W issue a written tenancy agreement. The Housing Act 1988 
(S20a) provides that any tenant under an AST may, by notice in writing, require their 
landlord to provide a written statement of any term of the tenancy which is not evidenced 
in writing. A failure to comply with that request within 28 days is a criminal offence, which 
carries the risk of a £2,500 fine. Under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 S48 a tenant also 
has the right to require the landlord to provide a name and an address where they may be 
 ‘ĨŽƵŶĚ ? ? 
 
 
Letting agents 
 
Letting agents are primarily regulated through statutes aimed at consumer protection 
although recent regulation has defined specific housing-related offenses, and these are 
listed below. These Acts were passed in response to criticism of a lack of clarity around fees 
and charges and to ensure that tenants and landlords are protected through appropriate 
redress schemes. 
 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 
This act requires an agent to display information about their relevant fees and membership 
of both redress and client money protection schemes. This information has to be displayed 
prominently in the office and on associated websites. Failure to meet the requirements of 
the Act can result in a civil fine.  
 
Housing and Planning Act 2016 
Letting agents are also, under the Housing and Planning Act 2016, required to give the name 
of their Client Money Protection Scheme.  
 
Tenant Fees Act 2019 
Further criticism on the clarity of fees charge by letting agents led to the passing of the 
Tenant Fees Act 2019. As of 1 June 2020 it will be only possible for letting agents to charge 
fees to tenants that are expressly permitted by the Act, including:  
x rent; 
x ĂƌĞĨƵŶĚĂďůĞƌĞŶƚĚĞƉŽƐŝƚ ?ƉůĂĐĞĚŝŶĂĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?ŽĨƵƉƚŽĨŝǀĞǁĞĞŬƐ ?
rent (for lettings up to £50,000 a year); 
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x ĂƌĞĨƵŶĚĂďůĞŚŽůĚŝŶŐĚĞƉŽƐŝƚ ?ĐĂƉƉĞĚĂƚŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽŶĞǁĞĞŬ ?ƐƌĞŶƚ ? 
x if provided for in the terms of the tenancy, a reasonable and evidenced fee for the 
replacement of a key or security device, and/or a fee for late payment of rent (capped at 
the Bank of England Rate plus 3 per cent per day); 
x payment of reasonable costs for assigning, varying or novation of a tenancy agreement 
as requested by the tenant (usually capped at £50); 
x early termination fees when a tenant terminates an agreement before  its end, usually 
limited to the actual loss of rent due until re-letting; and 
x payments for utilities, communications services and council tax where these are 
included in the rent. 
 
For all these regulations, a first breach can attract a civil fine of up to £5,000; second 
offenses within five years or continuing offences can result in criminal prosecution or fines 
of up to £30,000. 
 
 
Planning regulations 
 
A number of planning regulations have a direct bearing on property subdivision, changing 
planning use class (for example from commercial to residential or family housing to HMO) 
and the construction or use of temporary structures for residential use.  
 
Article 4 directions 
In normal circumstances, converting family accommodation into a HMO amounts to a 
 ‘ĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨƵƐĞ ?ŝŶƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŚĞůĚƚŽďĞ ‘ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ
Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015. Where 
a local authority deems it necessary to limit the incidence of new HMOs in order to preserve 
the character of an area, after a process of consultation, the authority can make an Article 4 
direction which ƌĞǀŽŬŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨƐƵĐŚĐ ĂŶŐĞŽĨƵƐĞ ? 
 
Converting a family home into a HMO in an area where an Article 4 direction is in place 
requires planning consent, which is likely to be refused. To change the use class without 
consent is an offence. Planning Development Control teams have the power to prosecute 
for breach of the Direction and to require reinstatement. However the breach must be 
proven to have occurred within four years of bringing the prosecution. Also prosecution 
does not bring any tenancies created in the property to an end, so reinstating property to its 
original use class is neither assured nor immediate.   
 ‘Section 257 ? HMOs 
Under S257 of the Housing Act 2004, poorly converted properties are treated by local 
planning authorities and licensing and enforcement teams as HMOs even if the units are 
self-contained. The conditions for declaring such property as an HMO include:  
x the standard of the conversion does not meet that required by the Building Regulations 
1991 or 2000 (whichever were in force at the time of the conversion); and 
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x fewer than two-thirds of the created flats are owner-occupied. Owner-occupiers are 
those with a lease of more than 21 years or who own the freehold in the converted 
block of flats, or a member of the household of the person who is the owner. 
 
Where these conditions are found, Licensing and Enforcement Teams have the power to 
treat the property as a HMO using the full provisions of the Housing Act 2004.  
 ‘ĞĚƐŝŶƐŚĞĚƐ ? 
Structures  W be they permanent, such as garden sheds or other outbuilding, or temporary 
structures such as caravans, mobile homes or shipping containers  W must not be used for 
residential purposes if they have not been given planning and building regulation consent. 
Planning enforcement teams can require the removal of such structures or fine offenders 
for continuing to let them for residential purposes. As with unlawful multi-occupancy of 
residential property however, such planning enforcement measures do not bring an end to 
any tenancy. 
 
 
Civil penalty fines and banning orders  
 
The Housing and Planning Act 2016 enabled local authorities to apply new civil penalties for 
a range of offences under the Housing Act 2004, as an alternative to more time-consuming 
prosecution.  
 
To impose a civil penalty fine, the local authority applies to the magistrates ? court to show 
evidence for the offence. If proven, the magistrate orders the fine to be paid. In the same 
circumstance, a tenant who has been the victim of the offence may also apply to the civil 
First Tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) for compensation in the form of a Rent Repayment 
Order. Thus a criminal landlord may be penalised twice for the same offence, in these two 
legal realms. Though neither penalty results in criminal conviction, both legal claims are 
subject to criminal standards of evidence to be successful. 
 
Whilst the civil penalty regime does not result in the perpetrator acquiring a criminal 
conviction, it does have the advantage to the local authority that the fines are paid to the 
local authority. Offences that can be dealt with through civil penalty include: 
 
x failure to comply with an Improvement Notice; 
x failure to licence a HMO; 
x ĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞůŝĐĞŶĐŝŶŐƐĐŚĞŵĞƐŝŶƉůĂĐĞ ? ? 
x contravention of an Overcrowding Notice; and 
x contravention of HMO Management Regulations. 
 
Where landlords incur a civil penalty, the local authority may enter the name of the landlord 
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚĞƌ>ŽŶĚŽŶƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ƐZŽŐƵĞ>ĂŶĚůŽƌĚŚĞĐŬĞƌ and/or the national database. 
The name of the landlord remains on the databases for a year from the time of the offence.  
If a landlord incurs two civil penalties they are liable to a banning order which prohibits 
them from operating as a landlord. The local authority is empowered to make a 
Management Order on the properties concerned, and step into the place of the landlord. 
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The more extensive use of Rent Repayment Orders (RROs) was also encouraged by the 
Housing and Planning Act 2016.  Under this act, it became possible for orders to be made 
without the landlord having necessarily been prosecuted but where the tribunal is satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that a relevant offence has been committed. A RRO can be 
claimed by a tenant who paid their own rent. In the case of an individual who was in receipt 
of housing benefit, the local authority can apply to recover housing benefit or the housing 
costs element of Universal Credit, and retain that repayment.  
 
RROs are awarded by the First Tier Tribunal where tenants can act as litigants in person or 
can be represented by professionals who are not solicitors. Awards can be for up to one 
ǇĞĂƌ ?ƐƌĞŶƚ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚũƵĚŐĞƐǁŝůůƐŽŵĞƚŝŵes allow for certain expenses to be deducted from 
awards. dƌŝďƵŶĂůƐ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŚĂƐŶŽƚǇĞƚƐĞƚƚůĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞ are likely to be 
further appeals against awards. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This section has summarised a framework of rights and obligations that landlords, letting 
agents and tenants are expected to meet, and where requirements are enforced by local 
authority officers. In some instances, non-compliance comprises a criminal offence but this 
is not always the case. Increasingly, local authorities are encouraged to pursue civil 
penalties, and landlords who are non-compliant in this regard are not  W strictly speaking  W 
criminal. One stakeholder was of the view that the law was  ‘ƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇ ? ? ?ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽ
deal with people who comply with the law. It ?ƐŶŽƚƚŚĞƌĞƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĚŽŶ ?ƚ  ?19 
ŶŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌĂŐƌĞĞĚ P ‘ŝƚ ?ƐŽĨƚĞŶĞĂƐǇ-to-prosecute, low hanging fruit with little real 
impact on tenant welfare, affecting small landlords who are ignorant or negligent. That 
becomes the focus of any enforcement action ? ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ‘the parts that are enforced do not 
ĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌƐƚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƚǇ ?.20 As will be seen in the next chapter, attitudes and 
behaviours of landlords and letting agents in the shadow PRS demonstrate a complete lack 
of interest in any mode of compliance.  
  
                                                          
19
 Inner London Enforcement Officer #2 
20
 Industry representative #2 
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3. Landlords and agents in the shadow PRS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Statutory agencies tasked with strengthening regulation of the PRS should have a good 
understanding of the characteristics of those landlords who knowingly flout regulations. The 
supply side of the shadow PRS is highly fragmented, but patterns are clearly discernible in 
how and why criminal landlords behave in the way they do. This chapter considers modes of 
supply to the shadow PRS and the business models and practices which are generally 
favoured by landlords and letting agents in this part of the market. As indicated above, the 
research method included analysis of over 180 cases dealt with by Safer Renting. Material in 
this chapter reflects that data, commentary supplied by the stakeholders and Safer 
ZĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŝŶĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? 
 
 
ĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ‘ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐŚĂĚŽǁWZ^ 
 
Categorisation of landlords in the shadow PRS market is highly problematic. This is because 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ŝŶ any particular case is rarely straightforward. Tenants make 
rental payments, but the status of the person to whom the rent is paid is not always clear. 
This person may be: 
 
x the landlord who owns the property;  
x the landlord who owns the property and still lives in it (resident landlord); 
x an agent who is acting legitimately on instruction from the landlord who owns the 
property; 
x an agent who is acting legitimately on instruction from someone posing as the owner of 
the property; 
x an agent who is acting illegitimately in managing a property that has been subdivided 
without the knowledge of the landlord; 
x a tenant who is renting the property and has themselves illegally sublet rooms in the 
property or has indeed subdivided it, and is living elsewhere; or 
x a tenant who is renting the property from a legitimate landlord or agent, and is illegally 
subletting it and continues to live in the property.  
 
This lack of clarity is in itself a substantial obstacle to taking enforcement action and 
conducting a prosecution, particularly since any one of the types of individual listed above 
may be using a false name or might only be known to the tenant on first name terms, 
contactable via a mobile phone. 
  
Safer Renting data on 259 recent cases where it was possible to make a judgement on the 
tenancy arrangement indicates that 50 per cent of these cases involved a tenant dealing 
directly with a landlord; 35 per cent of cases involved an intermediary letting agent in some 
capacity; and 15 per cent were highly complex cases involving some element of rent-to-rent 
or mesne  ? ‘ŵŝĚĚůĞ ? ? tenant arrangements.   
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Letting agents in the shadow PRS 
 
In the view of the spokesperson for the Property Redress scheme:  
 
Property should not be an amateur hobby and therefore landlords should not really 
be able to operate on that basis  ? ? ? ? If they are unable or unwilling to do so, they 
should have to use an agent. For this, property agent sector should be professional, 
competent and accountable so that landlords can trust them. The idea would be to 
create a virtuous circle that when you add the tenant into the equation you are 
protecting all interests and making it hard for criminals to enter in. 
21
 
 
dŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚůĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶƚƐĂůǁĂǇƐŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƚŽ ‘ƉŽůŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞ
PRS. The fact that so many problematic tenancies are linked to letting agents deserves 
attention. Renting from a letting agency does not remove the possibility for a tenancy to be 
conducted illegally. Indeed, in the experience of Safer Renting, letting via a letting agency 
ŽĨƚĞŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐĂƚĞŶĂŶƚ ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐŚĂƌƉƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ and illegality. These practices, at 
the most extreme, include outright fraud where individuals pose as online letting agents, 
post fake property details and secure up-front payments from the tenant with no intention 
of arranging a letting.  
 
 
 
Box 3:1 Scams involving letting agents 
A legal expert speaks of their experience with lettings agents: 
One of the things we're seeing with the young European group, who are coming in for a 
short time, and then leaving.  We're seeing letting agents who are spotting these young 
people and they have arranged properties that they know are not in the condition presented 
to this young person on a screen. They take a lot of money from that young person. They say 
you ŚĂǀĞƚŽƉĂǇƵƐŶŽǁŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇǁŝůůŐŽ ?ƐŽƚŚĞǇƚŚŝŶŬ “/ ?ŵŽŶůǇŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĂƐŚŽƌƚƚŝŵĞ ?
ůĞƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚĚŽŝƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĞǆƉĞĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŝůůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞŵŝŶĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ ?
They pay all this money up front, then go to the property and find it's in a right mess and 
then assume that they'll get their money. The agents know it's not as simple as that. And 
then what I've seen in one particular case recently, we had a letting agent took £2,500 off a 
person on a 3-month let, the property was a complete mess, probably not at the level where 
ǇŽƵ ?ĚŐĞƚůĞŐĂůĂŝĚĨŽƌĚŝƐƌĞƉĂŝƌďƵƚŝĨ/ŚĂĚǁĂůŬĞĚŝŶƚŽŝƚ ?ůŝŬĞƚŚŝƐƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?/ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƐĂŝĚ
 “/ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚůŝǀĞŚĞƌĞ ? ? 
The person goes back on the same day to get their money back and the agents will say we 
will give you your money back, but you'll have to sign this (disclaimer) and we'll take an £800 
cancellation fee from the same day that they've signed the agreement and it's a whole 
month's rent. Fortunately, and I would describe that as criminal behaviour, it's in breach of 
principles of fairness and consumer law, in breach of professional standards that you would 
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expect of a letting agent. But it's very difficult in the short time frame that the person is 
around for, to get the letting agent to pay that money back. 
22
 
 
 
Where criminal letting agents do actually manage property, little attention may be paid to 
the legalities of setting up a tenancy, taking deposits, making sure that rent is paid to the 
landlord, or attending to property condition and on-going repairs. Indeed, criminal letting 
ĂŐĞŶƚƐŵĂǇǁĞůůďĞĞǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ? ‘^ŝĚĞůŝŶĞ ?
landlords may be particularly vulnerable if they are insufficiently experienced to scrutinise 
letting agent practices. Again, lettings arranged online are problematic: 
A lot of the newer landlords are expecting everything to be online only  W virtual 
office. [The agent will] advertise on Spare Room, Airbnb any other website that they 
ĐĂŶƉƵƚƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƚŚĞŽŶĞƐǁĞ ?ƌĞĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?dŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĂ
ŶŝĐŚĞ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŶŽƚƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶƚƐ ? ? ?TŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞŵŽďŝůĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚ
use proper company names. TŚĞǇ ?ůůĂĚǀĞƌƚŝƐĞĂƐ “ŽŶƚĂĐƚ&ƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚǇŽƵĂƐŬƚŚĞ
ƚĞŶĂŶƚƐǁŚŽƚŚĞŝƌůĂŶĚůŽƌĚŝƐĂŶĚŚĂůĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?If they have a 
ƚĞŶĂŶĐǇĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁĞůůƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĂďŽŶƵƐ ?23
Letting via an agent creates the opportunity to forge additional links within complex tenancy 
arrangement chains. One of the Enforcement Officer respondents, working in inner London, 
considered criminal letting agents to be particularly problematic:  ‘zŽƵĚŽŐĞƚƐŽŵĞǀĞƌǇ
slippery letting agents where the tenancy agreement will have one company name on but 
ƚŚĞďĂŶŬƚŚĂƚƚĞŶĂŶƚƐĂƌĞƉĂǇŝŶŐƌĞŶƚƚŽŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?. 24  
This duplicity is evidence of  W and hides  W the intent to defraud the tenant and/or the 
landlord often via a rent-to-rent scam. The arrangement with the landlord may well have 
ƚĂŬĞŶƉůĂĐĞǀŝĂĂ ‘ǀŝƌƚƵĂů ?ŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐŵĂǇďĞƐƵďĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŝŶƚŽĂ,DKĂŶĚƐƵďůĞƚďǇƚŚĞ
ĂŐĞŶƚŽŶĂ ‘ƌĞŶƚ-to-ƌĞŶƚ ?ďĂƐŝƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚŵĂǇĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ
never receive a rental payment; and when the landlord complains, the letting agency 
 ‘ƉŚŽĞŶŝǆĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇĚĞůĞƚĞƐŝƚƐŽŶůŝŶĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŽƌĞ-emerge in another guise. 
However, the landlords remained culpable for the activities of the letting agent:  ‘at the end 
ŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐ ? ? ?ĚŽŶĞĞĚƚŽƐŚŽǁƐŽŵĞĚƵĞĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇƚŚĞǇ
ĂƌĞĨĞĞĚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐůĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶƚƉƌŽďůĞŵƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞ ? ?25 
 
Industry concern has been reflected in the creation of a Regulation of Property Agents 
(ROPA) working group. This presented a report to government in 2019 calling for the 
creation of a new regulatory body for agents, overseeing a requirement for all agents to be 
trained and qualified in order to be allowed to practice. There has, as yet, been no 
government proposal flowing from their report.  
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Shades of criminality 
 
In describing ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ ‘ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ? ?ŝƚis possible to discern 
 ‘ƐŚĂĚĞƐ ?ŽĨĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƚǇ which at one extreme amounted to conscious negligence and, at the 
other, highly organised crime. The landlords and agents discussed in this research do not 
easily fit into single categories, but rough groupings of criminal behaviours emerge. The 
following indicates an approximate percentage of landlords in each group within the Safer 
Renting data, acknowledging that there will be overlap between categories.  
 
Wilful ignorance of the law 
Roughly 17 per cent of landlords were small-scale, 1-2 property landlords who tended not to 
use managing agents. Research has suggested that knowledge of the law can be low 
ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ ‘ƐŝĚĞůŝŶĞ ?ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐ ?ďƵƚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐĂƐĞƐŝƚǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐĂŶĚĂŐĞŶƚƐŚĂĚŶŽ
intention of acting within legal frameworks and so tended to operate largely informally 
without tenancy agreements and were happy to let property in poor condition. One outer 
London enforcement officer commented: 
 
ǁĞ ?ƌĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƉŝĐŬŝŶŐƵƉƐŝŶŐůĞƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐǁŚŽĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽŵƉůǇŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
regulations or tŚĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?^ŽǁĞ ?ƌĞŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƋƵŝƚĞĂĨĞǁƚŚĂƚ
are coming through where there have been tenants complaining or alleging 
harassment for complaining to the local authority for the disrepair, and that seems to 
be increasing.
26
 
 
The attitude of this kind of landlord was expanded on by another respondent: 
 
dŚĞǇĂƌĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂǁďƵƚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ
as criminals. What they see themselves as are entrepreneurs and business people and 
ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐe any standards that apply to them and I think they see other 
people doing it and they think  “ŝĨŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞĚŽŝŶŐŝƚ ?ǁŚǇĐĂŶ ?ƚ/ĚŽŝƚ ? ? And 
then when they get caught, they come up with all sorts of excuses:  “Oh, /ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ
realise my property needed ĂŶ,DKůŝĐĞŶĐĞ ?27. 
 
There can, on occasion, be an ethnic dimension to this kind of activity. Landlords might 
exploit the trust and sense of fellow-feeling amongst members of their own cultural or 
linguistic communities. In these circumstances it is easier to persuade tenants to accept 
overcrowding and informal arrangements, with low risk of redress. One housing law 
specialist indicated that these kinds of tenancy were difficult to investigate:  ‘there will be 
ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽƐĞŶŐůŝƐŚŝƐŶŽƚǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ůůbe renting from landlords who might come 
from the same place in the world. So it can be quite difficult to dig into those arrangements 
ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ?ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽƉĂƉĞƌƚƌĂŝů ?.28 
 
Corner-cutters 
Around 25 per cent of the landlord sample had larger portfolios and was routinely breaching 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂĐƌŽƐƐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĨƌŽŶƚƐ P ‘ŝŶǀĂƌŝĂďůǇŝĨƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŽĨĨĞŶĚŝŶŐŝŶŽŶĞĂƌĞĂ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ůůďĞ
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ŽĨĨĞŶĚŝŶŐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌĂƌĞĂƐ ?.29 This group was often managing unlicensed HMOs:  ‘because 
unsurprisingly they are the worst managed. UsualůǇƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂůůƐŽƌƚƐŽĨŽĚĚůŝĐĞŶƐĞƚŽ
occupy, tŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐŽĨƚĞŶĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂŶǇĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂůůƐŽƌƚƐŽĨĂďƵƐĞƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶŝŶ
those ones as well as poor property conditions ?.30 However, these landlords were factoring 
into their business model the possibility that they might occasionally be caught and fined. It 
ŝƐŶŽƚĂďůĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŐƌŽƵƉĂůƐŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚůĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ƌĞŶƚ-to-ƌĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ?ǁŚŽ
 W in the view of one Enforcement Officer  W saw fines relating to  ‘licensing or even mandatory 
liĐĞŶƐŝŶŐĂƐĂŶŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĂǌĂƌĚ ?.31  
This group also relied on the probability that tenants would not pursue action against the 
landlord. Tenants may not understand their rights, and often the prospect of retention of an 
illegally held cash deposit could act as a deterrent:   
dŚĂƚ ?ƐĂůƐŽĂůŝƚƚůĞďůĂĐŬŵĂŝůƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐŚŽůĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŵ ?ĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƐ ?Žƌ
ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞĐĂƵƐĞĚĚĂŵĂŐĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞǇĐĂŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŝƌĚĞƉŽƐŝƚďĂĐŬ ?
DĂŬŝŶŐƐƵƌĞǁĞĐĂŶĂůǁĂǇƐƐĂǇƚŽƚŚĞŵ “ŚĂǀĞǇŽƵďĞĞŶŐŝǀĞŶĂĐĞƌƚificate by your 
ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ŝƐǇŽƵƌĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚ ? ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽďǀŝƵƐůǇŝĨƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚŚĂĚƚŚĞŝƌ
ĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞǇĐĂŶƚĂŬĞŝƚƚŽƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ďƵƚĂůŽƚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐĚŽŶ ?ƚ
understand the rules  W well, ĂůŽƚŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶd the rules. 
So I think deposits are the biggest issue. Because for most people that is the 
difference between living on the street and living in your next property.
32
 
 
Deliberate scammers 
This group, which comprised 36 per cent of the sample, approached their letting using a 
deliberately exploitative model which relied on obfuscation and false identity to evade 
prosecution P ‘The ones which use multiple false names and addresses all the way through 
are the really dodgy ones that have thought all about this and have really contrived to avoid 
it all ?.33 This group of landlords and agents was more likely to use more complex portfolio 
management models including rent-to-ƌĞŶƚƐĐĂŵƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘>ŽŶĚŽŶůŽĐŬĚŽǁŶ ?ŵŽĚĞůŽĨŚŝŐŚ-
density one-persoŶƐƚƵĚŝŽƐĂŶĚƚŽƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇ ‘ƉŚoeŶŝǆ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƚŽĞǀĂĚĞ
capture. Scammers often target students and other economic migrants. Again, this group 
tended to have a more extensive portfolio than either of the first two groups. 
 
 
 
Box 3.2: Other deliberate scammers 
 
Some landlords and agents are setting up complex ownership arrangements so that they're 
hard to track down. I don't know how much of it is deliberate and how much is casual but I 
certainly have clients where their landlord is called "Mike" and they've got a mobile number 
and then the landlord signs the tenancy saying that their name is "Tom". You know that 
you'll never get anything enforced against them.
34
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dŚĞǇǁŝůůĂůǁĂǇƐƉƌĞǇŽŶǇŽƵŶŐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐƚĞŶĂŶƚƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?ĨŽƌĂƐƚĂƌƚ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ůů
put up with a lot more, they won't know their rights, they will listen to the sham agreements 
and the other rubbish they hand out, the supposed tenancies, they will actually believe what 
ŝƚƐĂǇƐ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ůůďĞůŝĞǀĞĂůůƚŚĞƵŶĨĂŝƌĐŚĂƌŐĞƐ ?^ŽƚŚĞǇĚŽƚĞŶĚƚŽ ?ůŝŬĞƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů rogue 
landlords, they tend to prey on their own communities, because a lot of the online property 
letting agents, rent-to-rent agents, they do tend to be overseas EU nationals themselves for 
the most part, sometimes advertising these rooms in other countrŝĞƐ ? ‘ŽŵĞƚŽ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ? ?ŶĚ
they end up in these quite rundown flats with no fire alarm, no heating, but they're young, 
they're adventurous, they're transient. So people have been able to get away with quite a 
bit.
35
 
 
They [ie the perpetrators in a case under investigation] have got an office in Prague and an 
ŽĨĨŝĐĞŝŶĂƐƚ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?^ŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŝƐǇŽƵŐŽƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?ƐĞƚƚůĞŝŶƚŚĞh< ?ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŐŝǀĞŶƵŶůĂǁĨƵů
accommodation because it will be unlicensed, overcrowded, whatever else it might be 
breaching, and then you wŝůůďĞŐŝǀĞŶ ? ?ĚĂǇƐ ?ŶŽƚŝĐĞƚŽůĞĂǀĞĂŶĚŝĨǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚůĞĂǀĞ ?ǇŽƵƌ
ƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞƚŚƌŽǁŶŽƵƚ ?dŚĂƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŽďĞƚŚĞŝƌďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŵŽĚĞůƚŽŵĞ ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞŐŝǀĞŶ ? ?ĚĂǇƐ ?
notice to leave once  W ƚŚĞǇƚĞŶĚƚŽƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨƌĞĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŽǁŶĂŶǇƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?
And raƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůďĞƌĞŶƚĞƌƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƌƵŶŶŝŶŐ
it as a letting agency.  ? ? ?dŚĞǇ ?ůůďĞƐƋƵĞĞǌŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŽ W ƚŚĞǇ ?ůůďĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐŽǀĞƌĐƌŽǁĚĞĚ
households.
36
 
  
Young Europeans are here on a short-term basis and I'm finding that they don't understand 
the system here, they're only here for a short amount of time and are easy targets for rogue 
landlords who don't return deposits. The landlords just think, if I can hold out for a bit, this 
person is going to go.
37
 
 
 
 
Prolific offenders 
Twenty per cent of the sample fell into the category of prolific offenders, who made no 
attempt to conceal their offenses or their identity. Individuals in this group could be 
confident about their ability to challenge any court case and tended to carry on regardless.  
Often their behaviour could be unpleasant and threatening and range across a number of 
regulatory infractions and illegal behaviours, the least of which might be not lodging 
deposits with a government scheme.  
 
 
Box 3.3: Prolific offending 
Generally, they [ie the tenant] won't come to us while the tenancy is still on-going and ask us 
to make a claim. They will come to us when the tenancy has ended and the landlord is 
refusing to return the deposit, often claiming that they have damaged the property and we 
ƐĂǇ ? “ǇŽƵŶŽƚŽŶůǇŚĂǀĞĂĐůĂŝŵƚŽŐĞƚǇŽƵƌĚĞƉŽƐŝƚďĂĐŬ ?ǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĂƉĞŶĂůƚǇ
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ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ? ?^ŽƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ĂůŽƚ ŽĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞĂŶĚǁŚĞŶǁĞƐĞĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨ
illegal eviction, that'll be an opportunity for us to put pressure on a landlord to get the 
deposit money back, rather than all the tenants wanting to pursue criminal routes. It's just a 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? “/ǁĂŶƚŵǇŵŽŶĞǇďĂĐŬĂŶĚ/ǁĂŶƚƚŽŐĞƚŽŶǁŝƚŚŵǇůŝĨĞ ? ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĂƚǁĞ ?ƌĞ
seeing, people trying to get their money back, so they can move on and use that money to 
put a deposit on the next property.  
 
There will often be disrepair issues as well and access issues or problems with landlords who 
harassed them, during the course of the tenancy but it all gets packaged up when they come 
ƚŽƵƐ ? “Yes, it was horrible, a lot of horrible things happened and I want my deposit back, I 
want to move on with my life. ?And that's where we'll come in, sending letters and trying to 
help them with that.
38
   
 
 
 
Organised crime 
An estimated three per cent of the sample was individuals who were probably involved in 
more complex organised crime which went beyond housing offenses and might include 
trafficking, running cannabis farms and large-scale financial fraud. This proportion is 
considered to be an under-estimate.  The landlords and agents in this sample of cases have 
been identified as a consequence of licensing and enforcement breaches. It is likely that 
where residential letting is linked to serious crime then landlords and agents will be more 
ruthless in their methods for avoiding detection, and slip more effectively under the radar. 
Tenants trapped in these circumstances may well be moved on by the landlord to frustrate 
possible enforcement action. Further, local authorities are not in a position to investigate 
serious crime connected to housing offences.  
 
The stakeholders who were interviewed for this report were generally agreed that slavery 
ĂŶĚƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŬŝŶŐĚŽĞƐĞǆŝƐƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞWZ^ ?^ŽŵĞƚǇƉĞƐŽĨ ‘ƚŝĞĚ ?ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽdation clearly 
pushed at the boundaries of slavery definition: 
tĞ ?ǀĞŚĂĚŽŶĞƐǁŚĞƌĞǁĞ ?ǀĞŵĂĚĞĂĐĂƐĞŝƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞŚƵŵĂŶƐůĂǀĞƌǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
everyone in this HMO, which was awful, where their rent comes out of their wages, 
ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƉĂǇƐůŝƉƐ ?ƐŽǁĞ ?ǀĞƌĞferred that through to human slavery.39 
 ?tĞ ?ǀĞƐĞĞŶ ?ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇƐĞǀĞƌĞůǇŽǀĞƌĐƌŽǁĚĞĚ,DKƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƌƐĂƉƉĞĂƌ
to have had their identity stolen and have been placed into employment, and we find 
out that they are actually not getting paid for the employment.
40
 
zŽƵ ?ǀĞĂůƐŽŐŽƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇǁŚĞƌĞǇŽƵĐĂŶŚĂǀĞĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĨĂƌŵƐĂŶĚǇŽƵĐĂŶĂůƐŽŚĂǀĞ
some apartments used for prostitution.
41
 
  
dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞůŝŶŬĂŐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ZŝŐŚƚƚŽZĞŶƚ ?ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ĨĞĂƌƐĂďŽƵƚ
their migration status: 
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It's very widespread [ ?] It ?ƐŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐůŝŬĞƚŚĞ ‘ZŝŐŚƚƚŽZĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĨĞĂƌƐ
of their immigration status being uncovered and the fact that our government 
doesn't treat victims of human trafficking with great sympathy. But as illegal 
[migrants], many people are afraid to come forward and go into a law clinic and 
complain about housing conditions. So I suspect there are a lot of people completely 
under the radar living in abominable conditions.
42
 
 
 
Property management in the shadow PRS 
 
It was notabůĞƚŚĂƚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ‘ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ǁĞƌĞĞǀŝĚĞŶƚĂŵŽŶŐƐƚůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐ
and letting agents operating with deliberate intent to defraud and exploit tenants. The key 
principle appeared to be to maximise yield, which could mean selecting properties that 
were in poor condition to start with but without necessarily attending to any improvement:   
 
There is also a depressing amount of right-to-buy flats that are now HMOs, and 
,DKƐŝŶďĂĚůĞƚƚŝŶŐƐĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ŚĂŶĚƐ ?tĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚůŽƚƐĨĞǆ-council flats unlicensed 
HDKƐƚŚĂƚǁĞ ?ǀĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞĚůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐĂŶĚĂŐĞŶƚƐŝŶ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵ
are really bad. One I saw personally, it looked like it still hadn't been properly 
refurbished since the 1970s.
43
 
 
In almost all instances, landlords were subdividing property to create  ‘ůĞƚƚĂďůĞ ?ƐƉĂĐĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ
existing properties. According to one enforcement officer, the landlords think 
 
 “ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƉĞŽƉůĞ/ĐĂŶƐƋƵĞĞǌĞŝŶ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƌĞŶƚ/ĐĂŶŵĂŬĞ ? ?dŚĂƚƐĞĞŵƐto be the 
ǁĂǇƚŚĂƚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐǁŽƌŬ ? ? ? ? They know the law, but ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽ
engage with the council because these properties are overcrowded, the rooms are 
ƚŽŽƐŵĂůů ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞƉƌŽďĂďůǇŐŽƚĨŽƵƌŽƌĨŝǀĞƉĞŽƉůĞŝǀŝŶŐŝŶĂƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇƚŚĂƚŝƐƐƵŝƚĂďůĞ
ĨŽƌƚŚƌĞĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƚ ƐĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐƐŽmething out of 
nothing.
44
 
 
Indeed, certain types of neighbourhood lent themselves to intensive subdivision, including 
ĂƌĞĂƐǁŝƚŚƚŽǁĞƌďůŽĐŬƐ P ‘Obviously if you're in a 1930s semi suburban street everyone's 
ŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĞ ?.45  
 
Landlords could also deliberately target areas where it was known that enforcement activity 
was poorly resourced: 
They all go and find opportunities where they think  W ŝƚ ?ƐĂĐŽƐƚ ?ďĞŶĞĨŝƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ĂŶĚ
ũƵƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƐƚƵƉŝĚ. And they will go to the 
places where (a) regulation is weak, (b)perhaps ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞůŝĐĞŶƐŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ
ŽƌǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĂŬĞŵĂŶǇƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶƐŽƌƚŚĞǇƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞůŽĐĂů
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authority perhaps is not really up to it, where the property is cheaper, where they can 
squeeze as many people into a property as possible.
46
 
 
Often, landlords were deliberately using forms of residence that evaded scrutiny or control 
because actions fell between gaps in the law. Using these models, it is possible for landlords 
and agents to increase substantially the revenue achievable from a property let to a single 
household, and to let properties not suitable for residential use.   
 
In addition, certain types of management practice were also in evidence.  
 
 ‘ZĞŶƚ-to-ƌĞŶƚ ? 
As has been seen, above, letting agents were involved in a large minority of cases brought to 
^ĂĨĞƌZĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?>ĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂůƚŽ ‘ƌĞŶƚ-to-ƌĞŶƚ ?ƐĐĂŵƐ ?ďǇǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ
may be let involving a chain of two or more landlords and agents: an original owner, 
subletting to an agent, with individuals subletting and where there are no formal tenancy 
agreements at any point in the chain. This mode of working extends the opportunity for 
shifting responsibility for housing offences, which is problematic for the tenant and for 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?ŚĂŝŶƐŵĂǇďĞ ‘ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ǁŝƚŚjust one link in the chain acting in an 
unscrupulous manner, or all the individuals or agencies in a chain may have planned a 
deliberate evasion, with collusion to ensure that no-one is held responsible. Housing 
enforcement find this practice particularly difficult to counter:  ‘/ƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƌĞŶƚ-to-rent boys who 
are causing us the problems, not the traditional landlords who have been in the business for 
ĚŽŶŬĞǇ ?ƐǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?47  
 
It is not always the case that letting agents are involved in these scams. One central London 
enforcement officer, working in a high rental value area, indicated that they were dealing 
with cases of criminals acting as tenants and then defrauding landlords:  
 
The way the real cƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŝƐƚŚĞǇ ?ůůƚĂŬĞŽƵƚĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐůĞĂƐĞŽƌĂŶ^dŽŶĂ
property which they could be paying four or five thousand pounds a month rent. They 
pay the first month, they get the tenants in, collecting rent from the tenants and then 
stop paying the ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?dŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĐƌĞĂŵŝŶŐŽĨĨŝŶƚŚƌĞĞŵŽŶƚŚƐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞǇ
ĐĂŶďĞĞǀŝĐƚĞĚ ?ƚĞŶŽƌƚǁĞůǀĞƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚƉŽƵŶĚƐ ?^ŽƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŶŽƚŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽƉĂǇƚŚĞ
ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞŶƚ ?tĞĚŝĚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŚĂǀĞĂůĂŶĚůŽƌĚǁŚŽĐĂŵĞƚŽƵƐ
complaining about one particular guy who was doing this scam who has now 
apparently left the country.
48
 
 
 
 
Box 3.4: Complex rent-to-rent fraud 
 
We have ones where a tenant, to the best of our evidence, will deceive a landlord or a high 
street letting agent into giving them a property, him and his girlfriend is moving in. They 
then subdivide it, turn the lounge into a bedroom or maybe if they're really greedy they'll 
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manage to get a kitchen diner and they'll turn that into two bedrooms. So there's that one 
ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƐƚĞĂůƚŚŝůy sub-letting it.  
 
Then there's the other one where they will do rent-to-rent corporate company lets, where 
the landlord will pass it to a high street letting agent who will then pass it to, usually, an 
online one. And they will have a corporate letting agreement or there will be a corporate 
tenant, and then they will rent it out on a room by room basis, yet again doing substandard 
partitions, usually small rooms, dangerous rooms with no protected means of escape i.e. 
through kitchen. So we'll see those ones.  
 
tĞ ?ǀĞŚĂĚƐŽŵĞĐŚĂŝŶƐǁŚŝĐŚjust defy logic. The biggest one we've got so far has been a 
five-step chain: owner, letting agents to then online company who then went to another 
online company to the tenants, so there were five steps in it.
49
  
 
 
Degrees of criminality travel beyond intent to defraud on rental payment. Not all housing 
statutes and regulations are clear about who should be held liable for regulatory infractions 
and the distinction creates difficulties with assigning responsibility for failure to comply with 
licensing requirements. For example, in the matter of the duty to apply for a mandatory 
,DKŽƌƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞůŝĐĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŚŽ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇǁŚŽŝƐůŝĂďůĞ ?and that 
is not necessarily the owner. Rent-to-rent scams mean that defining responsibility for 
 ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŝƐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŝŶƐŽŵĞĐĂƐ ƐůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐŵĂǇǁĞůůexploit a 
 ‘ŵĞƐŶĞ ?ŽƌŚĞĂĚƚĞŶĂŶƚƚŽencourage them to subdivide the property as a means of arriving 
at subdivision informally, so increasing and sharing the increase in total rental take from the 
property. Meanwhile, the landlord evades any liability for breeching Article 4 directives or 
for failure to license the property as a HMO. If identified by enforcers, the mesne tenant 
simply disappears. 
 
Rent-to-rent arrangements also operate to disenfranchise the tenant. Where a property is 
let to an individual who then sub-lets the property but continues to live in the property as a 
 ‘ŚŽƵƐĞ-ƐŚĂƌĞƌ ? ?ƚŚŽƐĞƐƵďůĞƚƚŝŶŐƚĞŶĂŶƚƐĂƌĞ ?ŝŶůĂǁ ?ůŽĚŐĞƌƐĂŶĚŶŽƚĐŽǀered by the 
Protection from Eviction Act. They may be asked to leave the property without a court 
ŽƌĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚďĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚŽŶůǇƚŽ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?ŶŽƚŝĐĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞƋƵĂntitative case work sample, 
over a tenth of tenants had been denied their housing rights in this way.   
 
 ‘>ŽŶĚŽŶůŽĐŬĚŽǁŶ ?ŵŽĚĞů 
This model exploits poorly-framed regulations defining the difference between rooms in a 
HMO and single-person studio flats. One Inner London Enforcement Officer explained the 
model: 
 
The other problem we see is the converted blocks of flats that have usually been 
chopped up not once, not twice, three times sometimes. Sometimes they use what's 
called the lockdown model. It's where you chop something up into tiny little self-
contained studios and make loads of housing benefit claims for it, because you get 
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paid more housing benefit for self-ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?tĞ ?ǀĞƐĞĞŶĂĨĞǁŽĨ
those in the borough. 
50
 
 
The lockdown model capitalises on the difference in benefit between the shared 
accommodation rate and the one-bed studio rate in Local Housing Allowance, and is aimed 
at single LHA recipients over the age of 35. In this model, landlords subdivide a property 
purportedly to create a HMO, which under  ‘permitted development ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐ does not need 
planning permission. The properƚǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĂ ‘ŐĂůůĞǇŬŝƚĐŚĞŶ ?ǁŝƚŚĂŵŝĐƌŽǁĂǀĞĂŶĚŬĞƚƚůĞ ?
However, each room is then let as a single-person studio, typically with a minimal shower 
and toilet installation carved out of the room and a worktop installed equipped with kettle 
and microwave oven ?dŚĞƐĞ ‘ŵŝĐƌŽ-ĨůĂƚƐ ?ĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ? ?ŵ2.  
 
Should the property be visited by housing benefit officials  W an unlikely scenario  W facilities 
in the shared galley kitchen can be removed. If the property is visited by planning 
enforcement or HMO licensing and enforcement officers, the kitchen facilities are replaced 
in the shared kitchen to demonstrate use as a HMO and kettles and microwaves are 
removed from the individual rooms.  
 
Property guardians 
Under this model, organisations take on vacant, non-residential or institutional premises 
ĂŶĚůĞƚƚŚĞŵƚŽ ‘ŐƵĂƌĚŝĂŶƐ ?ǁŚŽĂƌĞŶŽŵŝŶĂůůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĞĚƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞĞŵƉƚǇƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?ŝŶ
a kind of sham tied tenancy, but who are obliged to pay rent. The arrangement creates a 
rent stream without giving the tenants any property rights. This model also avoids any 
regulation that might otherwise apply, such as the need for a HMO licence.  
 
There is a very wide range of property types being occupied under the property guardians 
model, from vacant industrial property, former pubs and fire stations to care homes. 
Property not designed for residential use is least likely to be adequately equipped with 
amenities such as kitchens or bathrooms/toilets. No effort is likely to be made to check 
safety and amenity standards required for residential use and so deficiencies are less likely 
to be addressed. 
 
However, this mode of letting exists within a case-law vacuum. Solutions are unlikely, since 
the development is often regarded as a creative and practical solution to the prevalence of 
vacant commercial, industrial or institutional premises. At present, this kind of letting 
cannot currently be identified as criminal activity, but legal commentators believe that it is 
not lawful to let property which fails to meet basic standards in this way and the practice 
could be challenged in court.  
 
 ‘>ŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞ ?ĐůƵďƐ 
Another ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŚĂƚƉƵƐŚĞƐĂƚƚŚĞĞĚŐĞƐŽĨůĞŐĂůŝƚǇŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ůŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞ ?ĐůƵďǁŚŝĐŚŽĨĨĞƌƐ
ƚĞŶĂŶĐŝĞƐŝŶ ‘ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ ?ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐŽĨƚĞŶŝŶĐĞŶƚƌĂů>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?These build on the concept of 
serviced apartments, offering  ‘ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?the freedom ƚŽůŝǀĞŝŶĂŶǇƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇŝŶƚŚĞĐůƵď ?Ɛ
portfolio although there may be a charge for moving from one property to another. An inner 
London Enforcement Officer mentioned this practice:  ‘There are several companies now 
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ƚŚĂƚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƚŚŝƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉĐůƵď ?/ĐĂŶ ?ƚƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌƚŚĞŶĂŵĞďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŽŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
one where if ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĂƚĞŶĂŶƚ ?ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĐůƵď ?ďƵƚŝĨǇŽƵďƌĞĂĐŚĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĞǇ ?ůů
ƐĞŶĚǇŽƵĂŵĂƐƐŝǀĞďŝůů ? ?51 This kind of letting again creates uncertainty in terms of the 
legality of the tenancy arrangement, deposits taken and fees that are charged. In particular, 
it can be used to argue the occupant is a licensee without any security of tenure. This is 
operating in the grey area of Trading Standards abuses considered to be unfair trading and 
can be challenged legally. 
 
Short-term lets 
Substantial growth in the short-term lettings market has also created incentives for scams 
around leasing properties that are then sub-leased as short-term lets via on-line platforms. 
The high volume of student demand in the capital has encouraged the proliferation of fraud 
in this area. 
 
 
 
Box 3.6: Short-term letting scams 
 
One letting agency representative indicated that:   
 
We will find companies who will find, maybe a student, and pay that student, to go into a 
letting agent and find the property. To all intents and purposes, you will do your referencing 
on that person who comes into the office and they will be renting the property. Sometimes 
they might try to pay the first six months' rent in advance, and as far as you are concerned 
ƚŚĂƚƚĞŶĂŶƚŵŽǀĞƐŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛŝƚ ?ƵƚƚŚĂƚƚĞŶĂŶƚĞǀĞƌŵŽǀĞƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĂƚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?dŚĂƚ
property then is put on one of the short-term letting websites (by the company) and they will 
platform hop now. You are only supposed to let a property as a short term let for 90 days in 
ĂǇĞĂƌ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇŵŝŐŚƚĚŽ ? ?ĚĂǇƐŽŶŽŶĞƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƚŚĞǇ ?ůůŐŽƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?52 
 
We also have an extremely big issue with [short-term lettings business], not necessarily the 
company but the principle of short-ƚĞƌŵůĞƚƚŝŶŐƐ ? ? ?ƵƚǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐŝƐǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ
these very grey areas where you have people renting and living in properties for two or three 
months at a time. Is it an HMO? Have they got a tenancy agreement? Or is it a short-term 
ůĞƚ ?ŶĚƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐĂƌĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ?ŝŶŵǇŽƉŝŶŽŶ ?ƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽŽďƐĐƵƌĞǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ
doing.
53
 
 
 
 
 ‘ĞĚƐŝŶƐŚĞĚƐ ? 
One MP Constituency team reported that they had come across a number of cases of young 
migrant men livŝŶŐŝŶ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇŐƌŝŵ ? sheds in back gardens.54 So-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ďĞĚƐŝŶƐŚĞĚƐ ?ĂƌĞ
garage conversions, shipping containers or lean-tos, often converted without planning 
permission, not compliant with building regulations, and not meeting Fitness for Human 
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Habitation or HHSRS standards. This kind of property tended to be more common in outer 
London:  ‘And the further out you get the more creative landlords or arrangements can be, 
beds in sheds, makeshift outhouses. The stuff that makes it onto TV programmes, that whole 
ƐƵďƐƚƌĂƚĂŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŶƚĂůƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?.55 In a bid to avoid detection by authorities, these structures 
are often fed via water or energy supply rigged up from the main property.   
 
No written agreement, payment in cash 
Landlords and agents may also deliberately ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐďǇĂůĂĐŬŽĨĐůĂƌŝƚǇ
over the nature of their tenancy agreement. In a quarter of all the casework analysed for 
the report, landlords and agents sought to evade the law by refusing to issue written 
tenancy agreements and often also demanding the payment of rent in cash without then 
providing receipts. Of the 31 tenants who were interviewed, more than two-thirds had no 
written agreement. For tenancies for a term of less than three years neither of these 
practices is illegal.  
 
However, the failure to provide a written tenancy agreement and taking payments in cash 
both make it difficult for the tenant to seek redress for tenancy incursions. Evidence will 
have to be provided  W to a criminal standard, in court  W of their occupation and rent 
payments over a given time frame.  A tenant not being able to provide a tenancy agreement 
ĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚĐĂƐŚŽŶůǇŝƐĂ ‘ƌĞĚĨůĂŐ ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƚŚĂƚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝƐ
likely to be associated with the tenancy, in addition to planned abuse of tenant rights.  
 
Illegal eviction, harassment and threats 
Eviction without due process was a common occurrence in the casework analysed for this 
report, occurring in 40 per cent of the sampled casework and in a third of the qualitative 
narratives. Stakeholder interviews also indicated that this kind of illegality was not unusual: 
one housing law specialist indicated:  ‘We are seeing outright criminality in terms of 
harassment, violence, intimidation, physical threats, illegal evictions where there is a forcible 
eviction ?.56  
 
Defining eviction as illegal becomes problematic where it is unclear whether a tenancy 
agreement has indeed been issued. One MP constituency team indicated that they had 
recently dealt with a woman whose landlord had taken her deposit, offered no receipt or 
tenancy agreement, and told her to leave after she had complained about a pest 
infestation.
57
 Furthermore, establishing whether the eviction without a court order is illegal 
often relies on facts that are difficult to uncover, including the identity of the landlord.  
 
/ůůĞŐĂůĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĨƚŽƌĚĂŵĂŐĞŽĨƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ P
ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐĞǀŝĐƚŝŶŐĂƚƐŚŽƌƚŶŽƚŝĐĞŽŶŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŽƌƚŚƌĞǁƚŚĞŵ
into the street.  Often, the tenants who were seeking legal advice simply want to secure 
access to their possessions:  ‘/ƚ ?ƐŽĨƚĞŶŐŽŽĚƐ ?ďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐĞŝǌĞĚ ?ŽƌŶŽƚ
ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽŐŽŽĚƐ ?^Ž ?ŝĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ?ƐůŽĐŬƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŐŽŽĚƐĂƌĞƐƚŝůů
ůĞĨƚŝŶƐŝĚĞ ?.58  
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Personal security could also be an issue: enforcement officers reported that tenants often 
complained of landlords entering the property without required notice.  
 
 
 
Box 3.7: Illegal eviction 
 
One MP constituency team reported that 
 
it would be common for us to see those kinds of revenge eviction type scenarios, where 
maybe the tenant has complained to the private rented sector team at the council and then 
had their stuff smashed up, kicked out of the house, that sort of thing at the most extreme 
ĞŶĚ ? ? ? ?/ďƌŽƵŐŚƚ along a case of someone I dealt with, almost a year ago, he was 
experiencing a revenge eviction.  
 
^Ž/ŐƵĞƐƐƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂŶŝůůĞŐĂůĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐĞŚĞŚĂĚĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŽ ?KZKh', ?^ ?
private housing team because his living conditions were unhealthy, so there were mice and 
cockroach infestations, there was water leaking from the bathroom. I think an officer from 
the team had been to inspect it and given a notice to the landlord that they were doing that. 
But he returned home one night and the property had been broken into and items had been 
stolen and his things had been put outside and he was receiving threats from the landlord. 
His house was broken into again. But then that was difficult because the person he was 
paying rent to was not his landlord, so it will be quite common that people will pay rent to 
ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŚŽǁĂƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĞŝƌůĂŶĚůŽƌĚĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚǁŽŽƌƚŚƌĞĞŵŝĚĚůĞŵĞŶ
involved.
59
 
 
 
 
Illegal eviction could also be facilitated through a campaign of harassment:  ‘tĞƐĞĞĐĂƐĞƐŽĨ
people that have different extremes, people who have had landlords changed the locks, use 
ŝŶƚŝŵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŽŚĂǀĞĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŽĂůĂŶĚůŽƌĚŽƌůĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶƚĂŶĚĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ďŽǇƐ
ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐĞŶƚƌŽƵŶĚ ?ƚŽŝŶƚŝŵŝĚĂƚĞƚŚĞŵŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?.60  
 
It is difficult for a tenant to secure legal support to bring any kind of action against this kind 
of harassment and threat. Legal aid is not available for these cases, and solicitors are rarely 
willing to take this work on conditional fee arrangements.  Even where cases are actively 
pursued, there is a sense in which tenants may continue to be vulnerable. One specialist 
housing law advisor indicated that part of the advice to clients was to take care: 
 
Yeah, yeah, people beaten up, pushed, shoved, thumped, which can form part of a 
ĐůĂŝŵ ?ƵƚƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐƚŽƉƚŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶ ĨƚŚĞǇďƵŵƉŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚĂŐĂŝŶ ?/ ?ǀĞŚĂĚƚŚĂƚĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƉĞŽƉůĞ ? “ǇŽƵŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞĐĂƌĞĨƵůǁŚĞƌĞ
ǇŽƵŐŽ ?zŽƵŶĞĞĚƚŽůŽŽŬŽƵƚĨŽƌǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞ ?ƌĞŶŽƚŵƵĐŬŝŶŐĂƌŽƵŶĚ
                                                          
59
 MP Constituency Team #1 
60
 Specialist in Housing Law #2 
41 
 
aŶǇŵŽƌĞ ?ǁĞ ?ƌĞƐƵŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĨŽƌƋƵŝƚĞĂůŽƚŽĨŵŽŶĞǇ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽůŝŬĞŝƚĂŶĚ
ǇŽƵũƵƐƚŶĞĞĚƚŽƚĂŬĞĐĂƌĞŽĨǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨ ?ĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ
who by definition are acting outside the law ? ?61 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has indicated that criminality amongst landlord and letting agents in the 
shadow PRS is spread across a range of practices which include financial fraud, routinized 
flouting of housing law and serious crimes against the person. It is clear that some 
perpetrators are simply using the internet and high demand for rental property to pose as 
letting agents or landlords and secure advance payments from victims who perhaps ought 
to be more vigilant. However, in other cases, criminality is expressed through complex 
chains of fraudulent lets and sublets where tenants, landlords and agents may be 
perpetrators or victims. In all cases, criminality appears to flourish in the grey spaces 
between definitions, where tenancy agreements are ill-defined, the mode of letting is not 
wholly fixed and evidence as to which laws exactly have been broken is not easy to verify. As 
the next chapter illustrates, criminal landlordism is seldom a single activity or action: victims 
are generally subject to a range of behaviours, which in itself creates problem in securing a 
resolution.  
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4. Tenant experiences of the shadow PRS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will present tenant experiences of living in the shadow PRS through ten 
anonymised narratives from tenants themselves, selected from 31 interviews. The accounts 
show that tenants are likely to experience multiple infringements. Illegal eviction was 
commonplace, and often  W but not always  W triggered by formal intervention by the 
authorities as a consequence of complaints about repairs. The chapter does not aim to 
present detailed analysis of these accounts: the stories are relayed without commentary. 
The experiences indicate that landlords and letting agents operating in the shadow PRS set 
no boundaries around their behaviour and this leaves the tenant without effective 
protection. The chapter ends with a summary of common emergent themes.  
 
 
Tenant case studies 
 
The following section presents ten tenant case studies, selected from 31 interviews as being 
typical of the behaviours and issues highliŐŚƚĞĚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?dĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐrelated 
to a range of criminal activities, from the wilfully negligent through to organised fraud and  W 
in some instances  W exploitation facilitated through the threat of violence. The cases have in 
some instances been simplified, since narratives were often convoluted, but in all instances 
here tenants have read their summaries and agreed that the summary represents a fair 
representation of their experience. In all cases, tenants were deeply upset and even 
traumatised by their experiences, which left them depressed, anxious and fearful. Italics 
indicate verbatim quotation.  
 
Adele 
Adele had difficulties through her teenage years: she was young when she became 
responsible for her siblings and eventually ended up homeless, with a long period in the 
hostel system. She fell pregnant, and following a period of ill-health also found herself in 
financial difficulty. She had been allocated a housing association flat but had not been 
prepared for the financial responsibility. ^ŚĞƐĂŝĚƐŚĞ ‘mashed up ?ŚĞƌĐƌĞĚŝƚĞǀĞŶďĞĨŽƌĞ
she realised what she was doing. She lost the accommodation and found herself in the 
homelessness system again. The local authority encouraged her to find accommodation in 
the private rented sector for herself. There were limited choices: landlords and letting 
agents refused her application because she was reliant on housing benefit:  ?ǁŚĂƚ/ found 
going into estate agents, [often] I would experience immediate rejection. So that was 
ĂůƌĞĂĚǇƉƌĞƚƚǇŚĂƌĚ ? ? 
 
She was determined to secure a property that was self-contained, and finally found what 
was advertised on-ůŝŶĞĂƐĂ ‘one-ďĞĚƌŽŽŵĞĚďƵŶŐĂůŽǁ ?. She secured the property with the 
ĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ PĚĞůĞǁĂƐŚĞůƉĞĚƚŽƉĂǇĂŵŽŶƚŚŝŶ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŚŽŵĞůĞƐƐ
prevention team paid an additional incentive payment of £1,000 to the landlord, to agree 
43 
 
ƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶĐǇ ?dŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƚŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚĚĞůĞŚĞƌƐĞůĨĨŽƌĂŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŵŽŶƚŚ ?ƐƉĂǇŵĞŶƚŽĨ
rent up-front. Adele had no option but to take out a loan under Universal Credit, and she is 
still repaying this loan at the rate of £127 a month long after she was evicted from the 
accommodation. At no point did the council visit or check the property, which was part of a 
converted garage. Adele said, of her landlord,  
 
^ŚĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀe planning permission for it. I made it homely, but I was only there for 
six weeks. The lady was a nightmare. The condition of it, I mean it was dirty when we 
moved in. You could tell there was no consideration for it, and there was a huge 
mound of rubbish, what I thought was just shrubs until it got warmer and then there 
were rats and things. The front door was very loose, so there was still a gap to 
outside. If it was colder you would feel it more. And it took a lot of messaging and 
insisting that I was going to contact the council to sort it out. 
 
In response, the landlord instituted a campaign of harassment. There were builders working 
on the main property, who walked close to her windows. Adele found it threatening:  
 ‘ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŶŽƚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?ǇŽƵĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ they were coming, why are there five men in the 
ŐĂƌĚĞŶ ?tŚĂƚ ?ƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ?EŽƚƚŽŵĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŐƵǇƐǁŚŽǁŽƵůĚƉĞĞƉƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ W it was 
crazy. It was humiliating [at] times, she [ie the landlord] ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĐĂƌĞ ? ?The landlady expected 
to have access without notice ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐǁŽƌŬƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŽŶĚĞůĞ ?ƐŚŽŵĞ ?
 
/ŚĂĚĂƐŬǇůŝŐŚƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐƐŽŵĞǁŽƌŬďĞŝŶŐĚŽŶĞŽŶƚŚĞƌŽŽĨĂŶĚƐŚĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƚĞůů
ŵĞ ? ? ? ?/ǁĂƐƉŝĐŬŝŶŐ ?ŚĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƵƉĨƌŽŵƐĐŚŽŽůĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĚĞďƌŝƐĂůůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĨůŽŽƌ ?
the glass had been moved and was off for two days, there was a high smell of some 
ĐŚĞŵŝĐĂů ?ŝƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚďƵƚĂŶĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƵƐŝŶŐďƵƚŝƚǁĂƐĨŝůůŝŶŐƵƉƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞ ?ŝƚǁĂƐ
awful, lots of vomiting. I had to go to A&E twice. It was a lot of headache. 
 
The landlord approached Adele at any time of day or night, and her campaign of harassment 
included sending text messages referring to information that Adele never received:  ‘So it 
was like she was trying to mess with your head sometimes  ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƌĞĂĐƚůŝŬĞƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƌĞĂůůǇ
rational ?. Finally, Adele was simply told to leave after the illegal conversion came to the 
attention of the local authority.   
 
Carlene 
Carlene was a young professional, living in a HMO with a shifting population of around 
fourteen unrelated young adults. The property was badly overcrowded, but the chaotic 
experience of living there was made worse by the landlord. He had a flat behind the house 
ƚŚĂƚŚĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐŚŝƐ ‘ŽĨĨŝĐĞ ? ?,ĞĚŝĚŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇǁŽƌŬƚŚĞƌĞ ? ‘it was more like a man 
cave, because their friends turn up at any time ?. Carlene felt unsafe. She complained to him 
ĂŶĚƐĂŝĚŚŝƐĨƌŝĞŶĚƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƚŚĞƌĞǁŚĞŶŚĞǁĂƐŶŽƚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐŬĞĚŚŝŵ ‘why are you 
ĐŽŵŝŶŐŚĞƌĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂŶŶŽƵŶĐŝŶŐǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞ ? ? ? ?/ƐĂŝĚƚŽŚŝŵ ?/ ?ŵƵƐĞĚƚŽĂ
landlord giving ŵĞ ? ?ŚŽƵƌƐ ?ŶŽƚŝĐĞďĞĨŽƌĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƵƉƚŽƚŚĞŚŽƵƐĞ ?ďƵƚŶŽǁ/ĐŽƵůĚĐŽŵĞ
ĚŽǁŶƐƚĂŝƌƐĂŶĚǇŽƵ ?ƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŚĂǀŝŶŐĂĚƌŝŶŬǁŝƚŚǇŽƵƌĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?.  
 
She was also worried about the safety of the gas boiler, and refused to pay the rent until it 
was inspected. Her landůŽƌĚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁĂƐƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞůŽĐŬƐƚŽĞĨĨĞĐƚĂŶŝůůĞŐĂůĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ
and pursue a claim for rent arrears. Carlene was able to secure legal advice, and settled with 
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the landlord out of court. However, she had to move back into the property, because she 
had no better options. 
 
Charles 
Charles moved to an area of east London to take up a job, and found a property with a 
ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůůĂŶĚůŽƌĚŽŶ^ƉĂƌĞZŽŽŵ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚ ?ŚŝƐůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌǁĂƐĞƌƌĂƚŝĐ ?
He refused to let tenants have the heating on, and ŝŶƐƚĂůůĞĚĐĂŵĞƌĂƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ‘he 
said, directly to spy on us ? ?dŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚǁĂƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚŵĂĚĞŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƐĞǆƵĂů
references.  Tenancy turnover was high, and the landlord frequently gave no more than 24 
ŚŽƵƌƐ ?ŶŽƚŝĐĞĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?&ŽƌŚĂƌůĞƐ ? ‘it felt like that at any moment I 
ĐŽƵůĚĐŽŵĞŚŽŵĞĂŶĚŵǇƐƚƵĨĨĐŽƵůĚďĞŽŶƚŚĞƐƚƌĞĞƚ ? ?Charles was uncertain about his 
rights as a tenant. The landlord started to impose service charges:  ‘he started to charge for 
things like closing a window or putting a pan away or putting the toilet roll back on the 
ŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ?Typically, the rent being charged was £650 plus bills, but one month these 
additional fees amounted to an extra £450. Charles was intimidated into paying:  ‘ŚĞǁĂƐ
quite threatening, quite difficult to reason with, and because he was so unstable it was a 
ĨŝŐŚƚ/ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƌĞĂůůǇǁĂŶƚƚŽŚĂǀĞ ? ?Charles eventually accessed housing advice, using the 
Shelter on-line chat. 
  
David and Sasha 
David and Sasha found a shared property on Gumtree, and moved into a three-bed house 
with a group of Algerian men who shared two rooms, and a brother and sister who shared 
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƌŽŽŵ ?/ƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƐůĞƚƚŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚůĞƚƚŝŶŐŽƵƚƌŽŽŵƐĂƐ
 ‘ĚŽƵďůĞƐ ? ?ƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƐŚĂƌĞĂƌŽom, irrespective of the size of the room. Indeed 
 ‘ƐŚĞǁĂƐĐŚĂƌŐŝŶŐŵŽƌĞĨŽƌĂ “ĚŽƵďůĞ room ? ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌŽŽŵƐŝǌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ? ? 
The landlord  ‘ǁĂƐůŽŽŬŝŶŐƚŽŵĂŬĞŵŽŶĞǇŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƐŝĞƐƚǁĂǇƐŚĞĐĂŶ ?ĂŶĚŝĨŝƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ
breaking the rules and the lawƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛŝƚ ?. The couple paid a deposit, but it was not lodged 
with a protection scheme ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĂ ‘,ŽǁƚŽZĞŶƚ ?ďŽŽŬůĞƚ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŝƚ
ƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ‘ũƵƐƚƚƌŝĞĚƚŽĨŝŶĚŚŽŶĞƐƚƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚƚŽŽĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ
with the laws ŽĨƌĞŶƚŝŶŐ ? ?There was an unpleasant atmosphere in the house, which had a 
high tenancy turnover.  
 
Issues came to a head when the landlord and her partner divorced. She wanted to extend 
the mortgage on the property, which was being purchased on a standard residential 
mortgage and let without the mortgage-ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?dŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚĂƐŬĞĚƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ
to hide their possessions when the surveyors came to inspect the property, and David and 
Sasha refused. As a consequence, the landlord became abusive and threatening, saying that 
ƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐǁĞƌĞŽŶůǇůŽĚŐĞƌƐĂŶĚƐŚĞŽŶůǇŚĂĚƚŽŐŝǀĞƚǁŽǁĞĞŬƐ ?ŶŽƚŝĐĞ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ƐŚĞ
gutted the kitchen and left it in the front garden, claiming that she was undertaking 
ƌĞŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?^ŚĞƚƌŝĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĐŽƵƉůĞĞǀŝĐƚĞĚƵƐŝŶŐĂ ‘ŶŽĨĂƵůƚ ?ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽƌĚĞƌ ?ďƵƚ
ĂǀŝĚŚĂĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞĚŚŝƐƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚŚĞƌĐůĂŝŵǁĂƐŽǀĞƌƚƵƌŶĞĚ ?dŚĞĐŽƵƉůĞŵŽǀĞĚ
into another HMO, but it was clear at the interview that they were again facing a very 
similar situation with a very similar landlord.  
 
Wilma 
Wilma had found herself in housing crisis after her relationship with her partner broke 
down. She was not able to find a property for private rental, due to limited fund and NRPF  µ
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[No Recourse to Public Funds] status
62
 which not allow me to apply for housing support. I 
was desperate to find shelter for my 10-year-old daughter ? ?tŝůŵĂĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŽ
move in with a friend. This person was meeting her own housing costs by illegally subletting 
rooms in the property she was renting. As  W essentially  W a lodger, Wilma realised that she 
had limited rights and attempted to find alternative accommodation. However, the property 
owner discovered the subletting. Wilma was blamed, and one day when Wilma was out, the 
landlord entered the property, assaulted WŝůŵĂ ?ƐĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌĂŶĚĚƵŵƉĞĚ the belongings 
outside the house by the rubbish bin so any passer-by could have taken them. The landlord 
changed the lock and refused Wilma access to the property. These belongings included  ‘my 
whole life  W career certificates that will help me to secure a job, my wedding ring, my birth 
ĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ?ŵǇŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ?ƉĂƐƐƉŽƌƚ ? ?The loss of these legal documents created 
difficulties for Wilma seeking redress through the courts, since she could not prove her 
identity or demonstrate her income to apply for legal assistance. The experience left her 
highly disturbed: 
 
/ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĐƌǇ ?/ǁĂƐũƵƐƚŶƵŵďƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞůŽƐƐƚŚĂƚ/ŚĂĚ ?. I couldn't get 
anything back I was devastated. It was so much hardship I have to go through with 
my daughter. I wish my daughter ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ have to through all this [. ..] It was a trauma I 
experienced  ? ? ? seeing all my daughter's and my belonging was thrown outside the 
house and I was living in fear that every day we could be thrown out at any time. I 
did ask for the council for help but they reject on the basis of NRPF, I still didn't get 
any support since then. I had to go through so much  ? ? ? I can't imagine how the 
landlord could get away with this and not be penalised for such an act. 
 
Diana 
Diana and her son aged three lived in a room, sharing a bathroom and kitchen. The property 
was damp, and had exposed electrical wiring. Diana sometimes smelled gas in the hallway, 
and the front door to the property was patched up with cardboard. The conditions were 
intolerable, and she complained to the landlord. One day, when she returned home from 
work with her son, she found that the locks had been changed. She had nothing but the 
clothes she wore, and nothing for her son to change into. The council arranged temporary 
accommodation, and she contacted the police hoping to be let into the property to retrieve 
her belongings. The police said that they did not help in these cases.  
 
Abdul 
Abdul came to the UK as an economic migrant, and moved into a shared property above a 
restaurant: two of his friends already lived there, and were members of the same 
community as was his new landlord. On occasion, letting was combined with employment in 
the restaurant. The landlord paid no regard to the law. He did not comply with ƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽ
ƌĞŶƚ ?ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ,ŽŵĞKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǀŝƐŝƚĞĚƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇŽŶĂƚůĞĂƐƚŽŶĞŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ĚĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŽƚŚĞƌƚĞŶĂŶƚƐůŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ ?ĨŝƌĞĂƚƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƐĂĚũĂĐĞŶƚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇůĞĚƚŽĂůů
properties being emptied whilst he undertook safety improvements; he was permitted to 
re-let providing he met the occupancy standards.  
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 No Recourse to Public Funds is an immigration status defined by the Immigration Act 2014 that restricts 
access to benefits to a ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶĨƌŽŵ ‘ĚĞƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĚŽŶŽƚ
have access to mainstream welfare benefits or support services 
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Abdul said that this was the case initially: he moved in with just one other occupant. 
However, the landlord quickly reverted back to his usual policy, and soon there were ten 
people living above the restaurant, sharing one toilet and a small kitchen. At one point, a 
family of four was living in one of the rooms. Abdul complained to the council, who 
informed him the landlord had not secured a HMO licence, and the landlord was fined. It 
seemed that the landlord had taken this equitably, but when Abdul returned from a holiday 
he found that the access to the property was blocked. The landlord again claimed that he 
ǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐƌĞŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƌŬ ? ‘/ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŐĞƚĂŶǇŽĨŵǇƐƚƵĨĨƚŚĂƚ I left there in the flat. 
ǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ĂůůŵǇďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐƐ ?ǁĞƌĞŝŶƐŝĚĞǁŚĞŶ/ŐŽƚĞǀŝĐƚĞĚ ? ? 
 
Ilya 
Ilya was a single EU migrant, who had originally moved to the UK with his wife and children. 
Following divorce, he moved to London and set up his own cleaning business. However, his 
income was insufficient for him to meet his own costs and family maintenance. He fell into a 
rent-to-ƌĞŶƚĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ PƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚǁŽƵůĚĨŽƌŐŽƚŚĞƌĞŶƚŝĨ/ůǇĂĂĐƚĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ŚĞĂĚ ?ƚĞŶĂŶƚ ?
managing the property and collecting the rent. Lettings were principally made to other 
economic migrants including members of his extended family, and there was high tenant 
ƚƵƌŶŽǀĞƌ PĂƚƚŝŵĞƐ ?ƚĞŶĂŶƚƐƐŚĂƌĞĚďĞĚƐŽŶĂ ‘ƌŽƚĂ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŶ
altercation one night which led to the involvemĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞ ?/ůǇĂ ?ƐůĂŶĚůŽƌĚĂĐƚĞĚƌĂƉŝĚůǇ
to try and cover evidence of how many people lived in the property and later issued a 
threat, saying that it would not cost much to have Ilya shot. Ilya is still living there and 
seeking alternative accommodĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚŝƐĂŐĂŝŶůŽŽŬŝŶŐĨŽƌĂ ‘ŵĞƐŶĞ ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ PŚĞĚŽĞƐ
not think he would otherwise be able to afford the rent.  
 
Anna 
Anna was a BAME British citizen and a single working mother who was also studying. She 
had been living with her mother since her toddler was born, but as tensions between herself 
and her mother reached breaking point, she realised she needed to find her own 
place. Anna took a room in a three-bed house which she found through informal contacts. 
The room included a shared bathroom and kitchen. Anna believes that most of the other 
tenants did not possess legal status to live in the United Kingdom and that this demographic 
ǁĂƐƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚŽŶƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?dŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ? ‘^ĂŵƵĞů ? ?ĚŝĚŶŽƚĂƐŬĂďŽƵƚŶŶĂ ?ƐďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚŽƌƚŽ
check her identification, but simply printed a tenancy agreement for her to sign and she 
moved in.  ‘^ĂŵƵĞů ? ?ŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ ?ŚĂĚĂƚĞŶĂŶĐǇĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĂŶĚǁĂƐƐƵď-letting rooms 
individually. Anna struggled to keep her son safe in the property:    
  
There was no heating, [...] and it was winter. It was really awful for me and my son, 
ǁĞƌĞĂůůǇƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚ ? ? ? ?DĞĂŶĚŵǇƐŽŶŚĂĚƚŽďŽŝůǁĂƚĞƌĂŶĚďĂƚŚĞĂƚŶŝŐŚƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
if we do it in the morning that means we have to wake up at four thirty or five to get 
ready to leave the house, so iŶƚŽƚĂůŝƚǁĂƐŶŝŶĞƉĞŽƉůĞůŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ ?ŶĚǁĞ ?ƌĞƐŚĂƌŝŶŐ
one toilet and one bathroom. In the morning, to use the bathroom or the toilet you 
need to queue and then my son goes to school in [xxx] ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶ
shower him, I just have to take him because it takes us almost an hour to get to the 
school. /ƚǁĂƐƚŽŽŵƵĐŚĨŽƌƵƐ ? ? ?ƐŽŝƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĞĂƐǇĂƚĂůů ? ? ? ? ?ƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝĨǇŽƵŚĂǀĞĂ
ǇŽƵŶŐƐŽŶĂŶĚŚĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĞǀĞn understand what is going on.  
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Anna complained to the council about the conditions. Her complaint led swiftly to 
harassment which affected all the occupants and created a climate of fear:  
  
There was one incident with one of the ladies upstairs, her sister came from abroad, 
came to have a baby and they were all immigrants upstairs. And he wanted her to 
leave because she brought in another occupant and apparently he even hit the baby, 
and /ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁŝĨƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚŚĂƐĚŽŶĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĚŽŽƌďƵƚŝĨǇŽƵŐŽĂŶĚƐĞĞ
the hole in the door, that was how hard he wanted to hit them. 
 
After another incident Anna called the police, because after  ?^ĂŵƵĞů ? shouted at her to 
leave, she believed that he meant to hurt her.    
  
ŶŶĂďĞĐĂŵĞĂǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚ ‘^ĂŵƵĞů ?ŵĂǇŶŽƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂĐƚŝŶŐŚŽŶĞƐƚůǇ ?ďƵƚƐŚĞ could not be 
sure whether or not the agent or the owner of the property knew what was happening. 
She strongly suspected they did:   
 
/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚ ?ƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŚĞ ?Ɛ doing, ŚĞ ?ƐŐŽƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŚŽƵƐĞ in [neighbourhood]  ? ? ?Ă
similar thing happened because he wanted to chuck them out as well. But I think one 
of the gentlemen in the house went to the agency and told the agency they [ie the 
tenants] were going to collect the money and instead of paying it to Samuel they 
would pay it to the agency.  I think that someone was working with someone there. I 
think they knew something about it. 
  
 ?^ĂŵƵĞů ?ƚŚĞŶĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚĂŶĚŝƚŝƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŚĞƉŽĐŬĞƚĞĚƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?ŽƌƉĂŝĚ
it over to the agency who simply kept it without accounting for it. The letting agent held 
ŶŶĂůŝĂďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ ‘ƵŶƉĂŝĚ ?, on the strength of a tenancy agreement 
which they claimed she had signed: the document had her signature ineptly forged on it. 
Further, Anna was shocked to find later that her name had also been registered for the 
council tax on the entire property.  
 
Although not yet homeless, Anna could not see how to defend herself so turned to the local 
homelessness team for help. She found herself being sent from the Homelessness Team to 
the Licensing and Enforcement Team and back again, both ƐĂǇŝŶŐŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?s 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐƚĞƉŝŶ ?^ŚĞǁĂƐŽĨĨĞƌĞĚŶŽŚĞůƉƚŽůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶĐǇ ?dŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝů ‘were not 
ŚĞůƉĨƵůĂƚĂůů ?^Ž/ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂůĂĚǇƚŚĞƌĞĂŶĚƐŚĞƐĂŝĚ ? “zŽƵ ?ƌĞŶŽƚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚ
ǁŝƚŚĂŶǇŚŽŵĞůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐƐŽǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽŐŽďĂĐŬ ? ? ?  
 
When the matter camĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƚŚĞ:ƵĚŐĞĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚŶŶĂ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
agent had falsified her signature and demanded that a handwriting expert be paid to advise. 
ŶŶĂǁĂƐŝŶŶŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƚŚŝƐ ?ĂŶĚƐŽƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?ƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽƌĚĞƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚĞƌ
was granted. She was finally re-homed by the council, but still has a county court judgement 
against her for a debt she did not incur.  
 
Romesh 
Romesh was a well-educated IT professional, but his life fell to pieces when his wife sued for 
divorce. He was living as a lodger in a HMO, but he was evicted after falling behind a week 
with the rent because of the way in which his work organised their payment cycle. The 
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ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚŚĂĚĐŚĂŶŐĞĚƚŚĞůŽĐŬƐ ?ZŽŵĞƐŚƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĞĚ P ‘The police had to be called, [they] came 
and loŽŬĞĚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶĐǇĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƐĂŝĚ P “>ŽŽŬ ?ŚĞ ?ƐŐĞĂƌĞĚƚŚŝƐƚĞŶĂŶĐǇĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ
ŝŶŚŝƐĨĂǀŽƵƌ ?tĞǁŝůůƐƚĂǇŚĞƌĞĨŽƌǇŽƵƚŽŵŽǀĞĂůůŽĨǇŽƵƌďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐƐŽƵƚ ? ? ?Romesh was 
homeless, but secured a package of support from a housing charity. They arranged for him 
ƚŽŵŽǀĞŝŶƚŽĂ ‘ƐƚƵĚŝŽ ?ƌŽŽŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĞƋƵŝƉƉĞĚǁŝƚŚĂƐŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƚŽŝůĞƚĂŶĚŵŝĐƌŽǁĂǀĞ ?dŚĞ
house had another room which was ostensibly a kitchen, but which was not equipped for 
use.   
 
After what looked like a burglary, Romesh called the police but the agents admitted that 
ƚŚĞǇŚĂĚĞŶƚĞƌĞĚĂůůƚŚĞƌŽŽŵƐĂŚĞĂĚŽĨĂƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŝŶƐƉĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ensure the property 
looked nice ? ?/ŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŚĞĂŐĞŶƚƐŚĂĚƐŝŵƉůǇƌĞŵŽǀĞĚƚŚĞŬĞƚƚůĞƐĂŶĚŵŝĐƌŽǁĂǀĞƐĨƌŽŵ
ĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƵĚŝŽƐ ?ŝŶĂďŝĚƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞƌŽŽŵĂƐ ŚŽƵƐe in multiple occupation. 
However, Romesh found that a gold bracelet had also been taken from his room; the agents 
denied any responsibility.  
 
 
Common themes 
 
All the respondents who agreed to be interviewed had been referred to Safer Renting by 
one of six London boroughs. The tenants themselves had in many instances approached the 
local authority for assistance, and in this regard the selection presented here will not 
represent the tenants who lack the opportunity to seek assistance. These stories appear to 
be extreme, but are unlikely to be the worst experiences.  
 
Some common themes emerge. First, the threat of eviction was evident in almost every 
case. Illegal eviction took place with no notice at all, often through the medium of simply 
changing the locŬƐ ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĂďůĞƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂŵĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂǁƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂ^ ? ? ‘ŶŽ
ĨĂƵůƚ ?ĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚƐŝŵƉůǇŚĂǀĞŶŽŝŵƉĂĐƚ ?>ĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽĨŽƌĐĞĂƚĞŶĂŶƚƚŽŵŽǀĞ
through a campaign of harassment, or through making a house uninhabitable  W in one 
circumstance, through the extreme measure of removing the kitchen. Eviction could also be 
forced through, simply by campaigns of unreasonable behaviour which might include 
charging additional fees or through regular invasions of privacy.  
 
All these cases indicate landlords and letting agents being willing to act illegally, with no 
intention to follow required regulations. Statutory authorities intervened on a number of 
occasions  W these were not necessarily tenancies that were wholly under the radar  W but 
nevertheless there was no evidence that landlords changed their behaviour in response. 
These were not landlords or agents who would change their behaviour if they were given 
access to training opportunities.   
 
Tenants were in many instances uncertain about their rights. Indeed, landlords in some 
instances misrepresented the law and indicated that tenants had far fewer rights than was 
in fact the case. Even where they were knowledgeable, it was not always easy for tenants to 
exercise their rights.  
 
Tenants were often vulnerable and felt unprotected. This was particularly the case when 
they were living with a landlord or a mesne tenant who was prepared to act illegally, and 
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ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƐƵŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌǁĂƐƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ a 
complaint. The law does not offer substantial protection in the circumstances instanced in 
this chapter. For example, protection against retaliatory eviction relates to eviction in 
response to a property complaint, and even then, only when formal enforcement has been 
already initiated. The qualitative interviews indicate that eviction might also be a response 
ƚŽŽƚŚĞƌŬŝŶĚƐŽĨĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽĂůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ƚĞŶĂŶƚƐǁĞƌĞ
frequently expected to return to or stay in property where the landlord had already 
exhibited unreasonable or threatening behaviour: it was regarded as reasonable that 
tenants should live with personal insecurity and the possibility that they might well lose all 
their possessions should a landlord decide to evict them illegally. 
 
dŽĂǁŽƌƌǇŝŶŐĚĞŐƌĞĞ ?ƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ? ‘ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞ ?ŽĨƉŽ ƌĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĐŽƵůĚƐŚĂĚĞŝŶƚŽ
complicity, particularly where tenants might be pressed into facilitating rent-to-rent scams 
or offered inducements to act as mesne tenants. The tenants who were economic migrants 
were clearly prey to a very particular type of exploitation which included high levels of 
overcrowding and being compelled to quit a property at very short notice in response to any 
kind of statutory intervention. 
 
These cases demonstraƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ŵĞŶƚĂůĂŶĚƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŚĞĂůƚŚĐŽƵůĚďĞ
substantial. Tenants were often living with low-level aggression, perpetrated by landlords 
ǁŚŽĐŽƵůĚĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚ ?ƐŚŽŵĞĂƚĂŶǇƚŝŵĞ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ of personal threat and 
also  W more commonly  W of insecurity with regard to personal possessions. Eviction often 
meant not only a loss of home, but theft or irreparable damage to all personal belongings.  
It is not surprising, then, that one tenant likened the experience to trauma. 
 
Tenants, trapped in impossible situations, rarely secured a statutory response that 
protected them or changed their situation. There were instances of individuals being 
proactive in alerting the authorities of illegal activities, but even in cases where children 
were involved, attempts were rarely made to remove tenants to safety. Indeed, there were 
ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇǁĂƐŚĞŝŐŚƚĞŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ P
ĚĞůĞ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶĂŶŝůůĞŐĂůůǇĐŽŶǀĞƌƚĞĚŐĂƌĂŐĞǁĂƐĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŽuncil with a 
£1,000 incentive payment to the landlord.  
 
In eight of the cases detailed here, tenants continued to live within the shadow PRS, 
continuing what had been a series of moves in the search for a better tenancy. In two cases, 
respondents were accepted under homelessness legislation and offered a social housing 
tenancy. Of all the tenants helped by Safer Renting, only six per cent have been recorded as 
being accepted under homelessness legislation.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has used tenant narratives to underline how landlord criminality is 
experienced, first hand. What might be regarded as normal market rules do not apply within 
the shadow PRS, since the regulatory frameworks for commercial transactions are largely 
disregarded. Landlords and letting agents show little concern that they might be caught, and 
indeed in a number of instances did come into contact with statutory authorities which in all 
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cases permitted those landlords to continue operating. The regulatory frameworks outlined 
in Chapter 2 simply do not offer an effective protection for tenants faced with a landlord or 
letting agent prepared to act illegally.   
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5. Obstacles to enforcement and justice: stakeholder perspectives 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The last two chapters have indicated that there is substantial evidence of criminality, and 
that ƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĂƚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƚǇĐĂƌƌŝĞƐƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĂĚǀĞƌƐĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŝŶƚĞƌŵs of 
physical and mental health in addition to financial losses and  W in the case of illegal eviction 
 W loss of home and often loss of possessions. Despite the severity this criminality, there are 
substantial obstacles both to effective enforcement of the regulations outlined in Chapter 2 
and to securing housing justice where landlords and agents are very clearly contravening 
those regulations. This chapter also summarises two cases dealt with by Safer Renting, 
where an attempt was made to prosecute the landlord concerned.  
 
 
Obstacles to enforcement 
 
Stakeholder interviews indicated that major obstacles to enforcement reflected the complex 
regulatory framework, the nature and scale of the problem, local authority inability to 
respond effectively, political will, and police ambivalence towards criminality in the PRS. 
 
Complexity of the regulatory framework 
As Chapter 2 has shown, the regulatory framework is large and complex. As a consequence, 
landlords and tenants  W and often enforcers themselves  W can be unclear about rights and 
obligations. A spokesperson for the landlord industry described the laws relating to the PRS 
as pŝĞĐĞŵĞĂů ? ‘over-complex and under-enforced ? ? ‘ŶŽƚĨŝƚĨŽƌƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘often badly 
ĚƌĂĨƚĞĚ ? ?63 The law itself created shadowy intersections where uncertainty created 
opportunities for tenant exploitation.   
 
Nature and scale of the problem 
Chapters 3 and 4 have outlined in detail the characteristics and experience of the shadow 
PRS. Local authority stakeholders were of the view that the nature of the problem itself 
contributed substantially to the inability to introduce effective enforcement. These officers 
were best placed to understand the scale of enforcement activity they were expected to 
deliver: 
 
ĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂůŽƚŽĨŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂďŽƵƚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƵŶůŝĐĞŶƐĞĚ,DKƐĂƌĞ ?ǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚ
ĂŐŽŽĚŝĚĞĂǁŚŽ ?ƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞŵ ?ďƵƚǁĞũƵƐƚĐĂŶ ?ƚŐĞƚƌŽƵŶĚƚŽƚŚĞm, there are just 
so many. We've gone off intelligence from Spare Room, our own internal databases. We 
ŬŶŽǁǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ?ǁĞŬŶŽǁƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞĂ,DKďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĞ
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŵŽĚĞůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŵŽŶĞǇ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĂůůŐŽŝŶŐƚŽdo. But I do not 
have enough officers to get round to them all.  We think there's probably somewhere 
between 4,000 and 6,000 more unlicensed properties out there.
64
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 Industry representative #2 
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 Inner London Enforcement Officer #1 
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Further, the range of offenses include harassment, physical attack, fraud, and failure to 
comply with relevant regulations within properties but also in cyberspace; and offences 
might be perpetrated across two or more boroughs. A particularly egregious case might well 
sit in an awkward space between jurisdictions where there may be uncertainty as to which 
officers and which boroughs should lead an investigation.  
 
In addition, more serious offences might well sit outside housing law, in the realms of 
organised companies fraud. Action against this level of criminality was almost regarded as 
fruitlĞƐƐ P ‘You can take a company to court and then literally they can change the name of 
ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ĐůŽƐĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĚŽǁŶĂŶĚŽƉĞŶĂŶĞǁŽŶĞƚŚĞŶĞǆƚǁĞĞŬĂŶĚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚ
ŐŽƚĂŶǇǁŚĞƌĞĂƚĂůů ?.65  
 
Stakeholders felt that laws were framed to ensure the better compliance of already 
compliant landlords. The law had little impact on landlords and letting agents who had no 
intention of acting legally. For example, the Deregulation Act offered little protection to 
tenants who were illegally evicted in response to an unwillingness to meet a rent increase, 
ŽƌǁŚŽĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ĂŶĚƚĞŶĂŶƚƐǁĞƌĞƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƉƌĞƐƐ
landlords for evidence that deposits had been placed in a scheme if they had no tenancy 
agreement and paid rent in cash without receiving a receipt. Overall, the threat that 
management and property quality infringements would deny landlords the right to serve a 
S21 notice had little effect where the landlord routinely ended tenancies illegally.   
 
Local authority inability to respond effectively 
Respondents were not always pointedly critical of the legislation they were dealing with. 
The problem with containing criminality was more often accounted for by failures in 
enforcement:  
 
 ‘UŶůĞƐƐǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂƌĞĂůůǇƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇĨƵŶĚĞĚďŽĚǇƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ going to enforce and  ? ? ? 
ĐŽŵĞĚŽǁŶŚĂƌĚŽŶůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?zŽƵĐĂŶƉĂƐƐ
ĂƐŵĂŶǇůĂǁƐĂƐǇŽƵǁĂŶƚ ?ŝƚ ?ƐŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ?.66  
 
 ‘tŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƚŚĞǇĚŽ ?ŝĨǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞŶŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ ?/
believe strongly that there needs to be investment in enforcement for local 
authorities, with ring-ĨĞŶĐĞĚĨŝŶĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĞĂŶŵŽŶĞǇŐŽŝŶŐŝŶƚŽĂďŝŐƉŽƚ
for different departments to take from it. I think the fines should go into the 
enforcement department to pay for more enforcement.
67
   
 
There was common agreement that a local authority openly signalling its commitment to 
ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƐĞŶƚĂĐůĞĂƌŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ P ‘If you have that, you create the environment 
that these landlords will not be so brazen in their activities and will know that if they are, 
ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂďŽĚǇǁŚŽǁŝůůĐŽŵĞĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŵ ?.68 Adequate funding is needed to ensure a steady 
stream of rent repayment orders, formal enforcement notices and prosecutions, 
demonstrating that landlords were likely to be caught and likely to suffer heavy penalties.   
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Local authority respondents themselves were often critical of local authority investment in 
enforcement activity. A licensing scheme brought additional income, but the income could 
only be used to support the licensing scheme itself and could not be used for proactive 
investigation of landlords who fail to license properties. Additional funding had been sought 
in some instances from the MHCLG Controlling Migration Fund, which was established in 
2016 and distributed £100m in funding grants. Some London boroughs had secured funding 
ƚŽƐĞƚƵƉ ‘ƌŽŐƵĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐ ‘ŽŶĞ-ŽĨĨ ?ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŝŶĂĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ
where serious on-going investigation might take years to pull together. 
 
Stakeholders expressed little comfort in the prospect of funding being recouped through 
civil penalties.   The Rogue Landlord checker, accessed on the 24
th
 February 2020, indicated 
that fines amounted to just over £435,250 for 81 infringements. Extrapolated across all 
London boroughs, this income averages at less than £14,000 per borough, a sum insufficient 
to employ even a single part-time officer. 
 
Other common themes relating to the local authority response included the inability to co-
ordinate activity across boroughs. One enforcement officer indicated:  ‘ƚŽďĞŚŽŶĞƐƚǁŝƚŚǇŽƵ
/ ?ǀĞůŽƐƚĂďŝƚŽĨƚŽƵĐŚĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚŽƚŚĞƌďŽƌŽƵŐŚƐŚĂǀĞĂƐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?zŽƵ ?ůůŶĞǀĞƌŐĞƚƚǁŽ
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƌĞŶƚĞĚƐĞĐƚŽƌƚĞĂŵƐƐĞƚƵƉŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇ ? ?69 ŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŽŶĞďŽƌŽƵŐŚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
had knock-on effects for other boroughs if joint understandings had to be unpicked and 
reframed. For example, some enforcement teams had been redeployed to check cladding, 
post-Grenfell, but without extra staffing resource this meant a reduction in dedicated PRS 
enforcement activity. It became difficult, then, for each team to anticipate how much 
resource other boroughs might be able to dedicate to enforcement co-ordination, or if that 
resource could be relied on over the long term. 
 
From the lettings industry perspective equally, variation across borough boundaries often 
straddled by the landlords and agents, was seen as problematic: 
 
The real problem here is the lack of any standardised, central database for HMO and 
licensing information. At present ŝƚ ?Ɛ almost impossible to get all the information 
required to understand which properties require or have licenses as each local 
authority holds their information in different formats and with different means of 
accessing it.
70
 
 
There was also agreement that the GLA or the MHCLG could usefully be more 
interventionist at a higher level and effect better co-ordination of enforcement work. One 
/ŶŶĞƌ>ŽŶĚŽŶŚŽƵƐŝŶŐŽĨĨŝĐĞƌŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚ ‘ĚĞĐĞŶƚůŝŶŬƐ ? with other boroughs but 
ƚŚĂƚĂŵŽƵŶƚĞĚƚŽ ‘ũƵƐƚďƌŝĞĨ ? interactions: In an ideal world it would be clear whether it was 
GLA organised or MHCLG organised or whatever. But a clear protocol, a clear framework 
ƚŚĂƚĂůůůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĐĂŶŐĞƚĂƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚƐĂǇ ?ůŽŽŬ ?ĐĂŶǁĞĞǀĞŶŚĂǀĞĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚĐƌŽƐƐ-
borough bods that can sit around and have a ĐůĞĂƌĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨǁŚĂƚǁĞ ?ƌĞďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐ?71 
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Political will 
The inability to co-ordinate effectively across boroughs reflected the fact that commitment 
to enforcement activity is patchy across Greater London. One MP constituency team was 
critical of their innĞƌ>ŽŶĚŽŶůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ P 
 
/ũƵƐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞ ?dŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ
politically is hanging baskets and rubbish collection. You could do it differently. One 
of the things that drives us crazy is that in contrast they really try and work with the 
housing associations to try and deal with [social] ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?/ƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚůŝŬĞ
ŶŽďŽĚǇ ?ƐďŽƚŚĞƌĞĚ[about the private rented sector] ƌĞĂůůǇ ?ŝƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚŶŽƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ
interested in.
72
 
 
Even where local authorities might be actively interested in the PRS, that interest could be 
compromised by their desire to retain good working relationships with the sector because 
of a reliance on PRS schemes to supply temporary accommodation and meet housing need 
under the Homelessness Reduction Act. Indeed, one industry spokesperson characterised 
the shadow market as  ‘public subsidy for substandard properties operated by criminals, via 
housing benefit ? ?73  
 
One housing advice worker in an inner London borough was despondent about their local 
authority ?Ɛ approach, which was so conciliatory it permitted blatant infringement of the 
Deregulation Act:  
 
hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇǁĞŚĂǀĞĂůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŝƐƐƵĞĨŽƌŵĂůŶŽƚŝĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞǇŝƐƐƵĞ
informal notices which is not enough to stop retaliatory action. They are landlord-
friendly in that way. They want to keep landlords on-side, they believe that landlords 
ƐŚŽƵůĚĂĐƚŝĨƚŚĞǇŐŝǀĞƚŚĞŵŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůŶŽƚŝĐĞƐ ?dŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚĂĐƚ ?ƚŚĞǇŝŐŶŽƌĞƚŚĞŵĂŶĚ
ŝƐƐƵĞ^ ? ?Ɛ ?ƐŽŝƚ ?ƐĂs if the Deregulation Act  ? ? ? ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶŵĂƚƚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬ
they are landlord-friendly because they want to encourage private landlords in the 
borough, give them incentives to join up to schemes. My own feeling is that they 
want to get as many landlords onside as they can so they can use their properties.
74
 
 
This kind of approach contrasts with a more proactive alternative. One Outer London 
Enforcement Officer indicated that their borough had introduced a rather more bullish 
approach: 
 
tĞ ?ƌĞƐĞŶĚŝŶŐŽut the message [to the landlord] that we are going to enforce 
against you. The communities are beginning to see some proactive work being taken. 
So that has had some knock-on effect with some landlords who are now probably 
going to be compliant a lot quicker. Whereas before, the officers used to send an 
ĞŵĂŝů ?ĂŶĚŵŽŶƚŚƐůĂƚĞƌŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŚĂĚĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ?tĞ ?ǀĞƐĞŶĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞƌĂƚĞƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ
through our change of processes and being a bit more proactive, and not being so 
informal. That was the turning point here, I ƚŚŝŶŬ ?tĞ ?ǀĞĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞĚĂŶĚƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ
enforcement a lot quicker. So you only have five days, no not five months, five days. 
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And we charge finĞƐ ?dŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐ ?/ĨǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚĚŽŝƚ ?ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŚĂǀĞ
ƚŽƉĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞ ?ƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƐĞƌǀĞ you a notice.75 
 
Clearly, it had been a political decision to take that approach. However, that variation in 
commitment to enforcement in itself could be a driver for criminal activity to target 
locations where there were no licensing controls or where the local authority had a poor 
history of prosecutions.  
 
Police ambivalence 
Poor police awareness of housing issues, and how to tackle that poor level of awareness, 
was a common theme. Local police did not play a strong role in supporting enforcement 
activity. It was common for respondents to report that police were more often called in by 
ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐĂŶĚůĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶƚƐƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĚĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞĂ ‘ƐƋƵĂƚƚĞƌ ? ?
and where police made no checks as to the legality of the action. There were a number of 
elements to the problem. First, police officers could be uncertain about their requirement to 
respond to a housing issue, which means that tenants reporting problems were unlikely to 
receive assistance:  ‘The police certainly have a terrible approach to victims of harassment. 
DǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝƐƚŚĞǇƚƌĞĂƚŝƚĂƐĂĐŝǀŝůŵĂƚƚĞƌƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǁŚĞŶƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚŝƐƐĂǇŝŶŐ “ǁĞůů/
ŽǁŶƚŚĞĨůĂƚ ? ?dŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŐĞƚǁŚĂƚĂƚĞŶĂŶĐǇĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŵĞĂŶƐ ?ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ is very 
poor ?.76 
 
In cases where the police have been called in by the landlord to support an illegal eviction, 
the tenant may simply be unable to explain what is happening:   
 
there have been really severe examples of those people literally being dragged out of 
their property, and what we have seen is that the police will sometimes be called but 
they will not see it as a criminal matter, even though it is a criminal matter, the local 
authority is generally the one that will enforce the law in those circumstances. The 
police should still treat these ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůĐĂƐĞƐďƵƚǁŚĂƚǁĞ ?ůůŽĨƚĞŶƐĞĞ
ŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ůůƐŝĚĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?dŚĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞďĂƌƌŝĞƌŽƌĂůůŽĨ
that, a tenant is unable to explain what's happening at the time and the police 
default response is, this is a civil matter, it's nothing to do with us. By time it comes to 
us, we say well it is a criminal matter but at that point it doesn't matter.
77
 
 
Some respondents indicated that there had been examples of initiatives of enforcement 
officers delivering training on housing law to police officers, but  W again  W this kind of activity 
ǁĂƐƉĂƚĐŚǇ P ‘ĂůŽƚŵŽƌĞŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞĚŽŶĞ ?ĂŶĚ/ ?ŵĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞŚĂƐŶ ?ƚŵĂĚĞ
ƚŚŝƐ^ ? ?ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇ ?.78  
 
An associated, second, issue is that the police focus tended to be on issues that were central 
to their own concerns. Respondents indicated that the police were not necessarily 
interested in fraud, which constitutes a major element of criminality in the PRS. The 
experience of enforcement officers working directly with the police was mixed: in some 
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cases, the police were clearly operating entirely to their own agenda. One enforcement 
officer indicated that during raids their priority was to collect evidence to make a case 
against the landlord, but the police attention was focussed elsewhere:  ‘I want people to talk 
ƚŽŵĞ ?dŚĞǇ ?ŝĞƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞ ?ĂƌĞǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚ “/ŶǁĞŐŽ ?ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ǁŚŽ ?ƐůŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ ?ŚĂǀĞǇŽƵŐŽƚĂ
ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽďĞůŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?/ĨǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚŐŽƚĂƌŝŐŚƚƚŽďĞůŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŶƚŚĞǇǁŝůůďĞ
ĂƌƌĞƐƚĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŽut and on to the next one ?.79 
 
 
Box 5.1 Safer Renting Case #1: Mrs C. 
This case involved Mrs C., a recently separated mother of three. The family was threatened 
with eviction in April 2018. Safer Renting wrote a letter before action, warning the landlord 
not to evict the family without a court order. Texts from the landlord in response suggested 
he was likely to proceed with his threat regardless and so the team supported the family to 
obtain an ex-parte injunction against the landlord to block his threat. However, the landlord 
had concealed his address and so Mrs C. was unable to send him the injunction. He came to 
their house with a friend at 11 pm on a Friday night and forced his way in, armed with an 
electric drill and crowbar. Mrs C. tried giving the landlord a copy of the injunction at that 
point: he screwed it up and Mrs C was kicked in the stomach during the physical assault that 
followed. TerriĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?DƌƐ ?Ɛ ?-year-old son screamed for help at the window, 
which was answered by several neighbours. They called the police and attempted to 
restrain the landlord. 
The police arrived. Mrs C gave the police a copy of the Injunction and asked that they 
enforce it. The police then took a statement from the landlord who claimed that he had 
been the victim of an assault. The police arrested the neighbours and the landlord, but 
released the landlord soon afterwards, keeping the neighbours in custody overnight. Mrs C. 
was terrified to see the landlord retrieving his tools from outside their home in the small 
hours of the morning, knowing the people that had come to protect her family were in 
custody. 
Safer Renting were called the next morning. They were unable to get through to the custody 
suite by telephone and went in person and explained the background to the case to the 
police and to establish their duty to enforce the injunction against the landlord. The police 
officer on shift duty undertook to review the case. The neighbours were released from 
custody on bail that afternoon. However the case was not reviewed; an investigation was 
finally undertaken a year later, at which point it was decided not to prosecute the 
neighbours. 
Safer Renting referred the case to a housing solicitor who brought a successful claim for 
£25,000 damages against the landlord ǁŚŽ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƐĂŝĚďǇƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐũƵĚŐĞ ? “had lied and 
lied and lied ? ?EŽƉŽůŝĐĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĞǀĞƌƚĂŬĞŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ? 
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Obstacles to housing justice 
 
There were multiple obstacles to securing housing justice, from the point of initial access to 
legal advice through to the successful prosecution and punishment of offenders.  
 
Limited access to housing advice and legal aid 
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) reduced the types 
of housing work that are covered by legal aid. Assistance is available only for cases of 
defence against possession proceedings, threat of illegal eviction or of dealing with 
immediate health and safety threats resulting from poor property conditions. Restrictions in 
the availability of funding has led to the closure of specialist housing law centres and 
reduced the number of specialist solicitors in housing law at a time in which demand for 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŚĂƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇ ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ ‘ĂĚǀŝĐĞĚĞƐĞƌƚƐ ?ĂĐƌŽƐƐ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ĞǀĞŶ
where advice may be available, the eligibility criteria for legal aid exclude many individuals. 
This exclusion, ironically, affects people who may be unable to demonstrate that their 
income is indeed low enough to qualify because they lack any formal banking services, may 
be paid cash in hand or simply not have an income at all.  In some instances the evidence for 
income is lacking because the offending landlord dumped or stole it during the course of an 
illegal eviction. 
 
Economic migrants are a key tenant group in the shadow PRS, and some of these will have 
no ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽƌŝŶƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƐ ‘ŶŽƌĞĐŽƵƌƐĞƚŽƉƵďůŝĐĨƵŶĚƐ ? if they are unable to work 
for some reason. ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽŽŶĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚŝŶŚŽƵƐŝŶŐůĂǁ P ‘There will be lots of people who 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƐĞĐƵƌĞŝmmigration ƐƚĂƚƵƐǁŚŽĂƌĞƌĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŽĂƌĞƵŶůĂǁĨƵůůǇĞǀŝĐƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ
ŶŽƉĂƉĞƌƚƌĂŝů ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂůĂŶĚůŽƌĚǁŚŽŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞƚŚĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŝŶĂǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŝŶĂǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƚĞŶĂŶĐǇďƵƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ
that ǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚƐĞĞƚŚĞŵ ? ? In the worst cases, there will be a combination of uncertainty 
ĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŽĐĐƵƉĂŶƚ ?ƐůĞŐĂůƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘creates 
problems about where the occupants stand legally, because if you dissect it, do they have a 
tenancy? The worse it is sometimes the harder it is to bring a claim ? ?80 ? 
 
 
 
Box 5.2: Safer Renting case #2: Mrs S. 
This complex case took over 30 paralegal hours to resolve over an extended period of time. 
Mrs S., a nurse, had entered into a joint tenancy with her husband. The property was let by 
the owner who was also a director of the agency managing the tenancy. DƌƐ^ ? ?Ɛmarriage 
failed following a series of family tragedies that left her with funeral debt and responsibility 
for the care of her disabled mother. Rent arrears accrued and the landlord initiated a 
possession claim. Mrs S. did not agree with that rent arrears amounted to £6,800 as claimed 
by the landlord. She had taken the step of securing legal insurance with her bank, but  ‘they 
saŝĚƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĞůƉǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚǁĂƐƐŚŽƌƚŶŽƚŝĐĞĂŶĚ [the] case was too 
ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ?.  
Mrs S. received help from Safer Renting to enter a defence against the possession claim on 
the grounds of false accounting for the size of the debt. The ĐŽƵƌƚ ‘ůŽƐƚ ?ƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƉĂƉĞƌƐ
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that made DƌƐ^ ? ?Ɛ case and her duty solicitor was unable to secure an adjournment for a 
resubmission of the defence. The case was awarded against Mrs S. and her ex-husband as 
joint tenants, leaving them with a money judgement of £6,800. Mrs S. ?ƐĞǆ-husband agreed 
to apply to the court on a technicality: he had never been served with papers despite being 
a joint tenant. A review of the case would have meant that their evidence on false 
accounting would be heard. However, in a letter so long delayed that it was too late to 
appeal, the court rejected the application claiming (incorrectly) that the ex-husband had 
indeed been present at the court hearing.  
DƌƐ^ ?ƐůĂŶĚůŽƌĚďĞĐĂŵĞĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇĚĞůĂǇƐŝŶƚŚĞďĂŝůŝĨĨ ?ƐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƚŽĞŶforce the order, 
and applied to transfer the case to the High Court. The Judge in this instance accepted an 
explanatory letter from Mrs S., and blocked the money judgement from being enforced. The 
landlord, who had by this time recovered possession of the flat, simply dropped the case. 
Mrs S. had lost her home, but had been shielded from a county court judgement for a debt 
she had not incurred.  
 
 
 
Tenant unwillingness to prosecute 
Difficulties in securing housing justice are further compounded by the fact that bringing a 
case requires tenant commitment. Tenants, misunderstanding their rights, fail to pursue 
valid actions:   ‘Weople will sometimes assume that if they owe rent, they have to leave, if 
they owe rent they might be doing something that is criminaůůǇǁƌŽŶŐ ?dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂůŽƚŽĨ
ŵƵĚĚůĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐ ? ?81  
 
More often, tenants simply do not pursue action because they are living in part of the 
market where they expect that the landlord or letting agent will act illegally. In some 
instances, tenants may regard themselves lucky to be housed at all:  ‘especially those on 
housing benefit, because it was probably a massive struggle just to get the flat in the first 
place, and so if they have to go on a wild goose chase to find someone who will accept them 
on housing benefit, they are less likely to want to complain or do something about their 
situation.
82
 
 
Pressures in the housing market have lowered expectations subƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇ P ‘availability in 
London and the cost of accommodation means that landlords can get away with packing 
people in and people live in appalling conditions and put up with it ? ?83 Even where a tenant 
might be sufficiently conversant with their rights and willing to take action, tenants often 
thought it was simply not worth pursuing a prosecution where the outcome was uncertain.  
 
Two classes of redress are available: a reinstatement of occupation and associated tenure 
rights where there has been attempted or actual eviction; and compensation from the 
landlord for illegal eviction, disrepair, harassment etc. Tenant willingness to pursue redress 
was conditioned by the likely outcome. Stakeholder respondents generally agreed that 
tenants were hardly motivated to act if the outcome was for them to retain a poor-quality 
property perhaps ǁŝƚŚĂŶƵŶĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďůĞƌĞŶƚ P ‘a six-month tenancy at market rent is not 
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ǁŽƌƚŚĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĨŽƌ ?.84 The appetite for legal action against eviction was much higher amongst 
social tenants who, it was felt, had something valuable to lose.  
 
It was reported that even a simple rent repayment order from the First Tier Tribunal 
typically requires between 40 and 90 hours of paralegal casework, and take a year from 
start to finish. For a tenant to pursue compensation from the landlord comprises a 
substantial commitment of time and resource. If the tenant is continuing to live in the 
ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŝŵĞ ?ƚĂŬŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĞǆƉŽƐĞƚŚe tenant to further 
harassment and insecurity and the probability that the landlord will eventually serve a legal 
 ‘ŶŽĨĂƵůƚ ?ĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?There was perhaps just one area where private tenants were willing to 
take action, and that was to recover unfairly retained deposits at the end of a tenancy. 
However, once these have been returned, tenants were unlikely to want to pursue further 
action even where the landlord or agent was evidently guilty of further breaches and it 
might be possible to secure compensation (as in Box 5.1).  
 
Taking landlords to court 
Prosecuting a landlord or letting agent for housing-related offenses is by no means 
straightforward. Some housing enforcement teams employ protocols that give the 
perpetrator the opportunity to correct their offending behaviour and thereby avoid 
ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽƌŶĞƌĐƵƚƚŝŶŐ ?ůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐĂŶĚĂŐĞŶƚƐǁŚŽ simply 
fail to comply until the point at which they are caught. 
 
Where a local authority seeks to pursue a case, there are delays. Since 2010, a major 
programme of reform to the judiciary has seen the closure of over half of all county and 
magistrates courts; and questions have been raised about the expense and inconvenience of 
ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ ‘ƚƌĂǀĞů-to-ĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƚŝŵĞƐĨĂůůŝŶŐĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞůǇŽŶůŽǁĞƌ-income complainants.85 
Furthermore, maladministration and understaffing have led to problems: Safer Renting has 
experience of a number of mistakes including legal bundles going missing in the courts, 
letters from courts about cases being sent to the wrong address, and letters being sent too 
late for appeals to be made in time or for directions to be complied with.  
 
Further, as indicated above, it can be very difficult for tenants to make a case where the 
landlord has stolen the documents needed to validate the claim. Safer Renting has recently 
supported a tenant whose documentation  W including his passport  W was taken by the 
landlord. With no evidence to demonstrate his income, he could not claim legal aid or fee 
remission to seek an injunction against the offender.  
 
Where the local authority is more proactive with prosecution, they must present evidence 
that meets the standard for criminal conviction. That is, the evidence shows that the person 
being charged is  W above all reasonable doubt  W guilty of the offence. This is problematic 
where more than one person could have committed the offence, as often happens in 
housing crimes. Prosecution requires the collection of witness evidence, the person to be 
charged must have been interviewed properly under caution and a prosecution case 
prepared and submitted by an authority with the power to bring that criminal prosecution.  
As a consequence, bringing a case against a landlord or letting agent is a remarkably costly 
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business for a local authority. Some simply lack the legal infrastructure to deal with this kind 
of work: local authority solicitors may be more set up to defend the local authority from 
prosecution than to seek action. The very nature and range of crimes involved means a 
substantial commitment of resource simply to locating responsibility and isolating the 
perpetrators. Third sector agencies were even less likely to be willing to accommodate that 
burden, as one respondent indicated: 
  
One of the big problems is, are you ever going to cover your costs? Cost recovery, 
who is your opponent? A very common theme will be dealing with intermediate 
ĂŐĞŶƚƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽŶĂŵĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂƚĞůĞƉŚŽŶĞŶƵŵďĞƌ ?
Trying to establish a link to the freehold owner where there are parties in between, 
rent-to-rent scams, they make it incredibly awkward to pursue your legal remedies, 
ǁŚŝĐŚďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇŵĞĂŶƐǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŶŽƚ ŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚĚĂŵĂŐĞƐĂŶĚǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚ
ĐŽƐƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĞǇůĂĐŬǀŝĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƵƐƚŽƚĂŬĞŽŶĂƐĂĐĂƐĞďƵƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞũƵƐƚŶŽƚ
ǁŽƌƚŚŝƚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĚĂŵĂŐĞƐŝĨƚŚĞĐůŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚƉĂŝĚ ?^ŽǁĞŐĞƚƋƵŝƚĞĂ
few cases like that, proper unlawful eviction cases but with no viable opponent to 
take on.
86
 
 
ZĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐĚĂŵĂŐĞƐĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐǁŚĞƌĞĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇ ‘ƉŚŽĞŶŝǆ ? ?ĂŶĚ
responsibility for the debt disappears with the folded-up company:  ‘aŶǇďŽĚǇ ?could go next 
door and rent an offŝĐĞĂŶĚƐĞƚƵƉĂůĞƚƚŝŶŐƐĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚĂŬĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƐĂŶĚ
ƐƉĞŶĚƚŚĂƚŵŽŶĞǇ ?/ĨǇŽƵ ?ƌĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚĂŶĚĨŽƵŶĚŽƵƚĨŽƌŝƚ- people are getting away with it, 
then dissolving their agencies and setting up under another name. 
87
 
 
Even where it might be possible to pin down a perpetrator, then battling through the courts 
can be a daunting prospect given the resources that landlords and letting agents may be 
able to deploy:  ‘ŝĨƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĨŝŐŚƚƵƐƚŚĞǇǁŝůůĨŝŐŚƚƵƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞŐŽƚ
money and if they have a million-pound portfolio they can hire the best barristers and 
ƐŽůŝĐŝƚŽƌƐ ?^ŽƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĂůŝƚƚůĞĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ?.88  
 
Rates of prosecution and proportionate punishment 
Concern about the court system was shared by one industry representative:  ‘The law needs 
to change so that they convict people quicker. I know some of these enforcement agencies 
are doing what they can but if it's going to take a year plus to get one person into court, who 
ƚŚĞĨŝŶĞŵĞĂŶƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐƚŽ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŶŽƚŐŽŽd enough ?.89 As indicated in this comment, even 
where cases might be brought successfully, the level of fines does not act as a deterrent for 
prolific offenders. Indeed, a landlord might well risk an illegal eviction, since the fine if 
convicted is less than the cost of securing a possession order through the legal route. For 
example, in 2015, Swansea landlord Sean MacManus was convicted of illegal eviction under 
the Protection from Eviction Act, and was charged just £105 and £1,000 costs with an 
additional  ? ? ?ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐƵƌĐŚĂƌŐĞƐŝŶĐĞŚĞŚĂĚĚƵŵƉĞĚĂůůŚŝƐƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞ
ƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?ĚƌŝǀĞǁĂǇ ? 
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Criminal fines may be regarded as a minor irritation by some landlords, and are 
disproportionately lenient given the trauma visited on the tenant. Recent publicised cases 
include the Oxford landlord Riasat Ali who in 2015 was fined by the Magistrates Court £180 
for illegally evicting and £300 for conducting a campaign of harassment against a tenant, 
who had been repeatedly threatened with violence by Ali and his family. Ali was also 
ordered to pay £1,000 costs to the Council. At the time, Oxford Councillor Mike Rowley 
commented  ‘/ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞůŝŬĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶĂƐƚŝĨĨĞƌƉĞŶĂůƚǇĂƐǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƐĞŶĚĂĐůĞĂƌ
message to rogue landlords that they cannot just tĂŬĞƚŚĞůĂǁŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŚĂŶĚƐ ?90. In 
2017, a Peterborough Landlord, Jeffrey Reeve, was charged with illegal eviction after 
ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞůŽĐŬƐŽŶŚŝƐƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ŚŽŵĞǁŚŝůƐƚŚĞǁĂƐŽƵƚ ?ŽŶŚŝƐƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚ Wwho 
only had the clothes he was wearing  W was hospitalised after sleeping outside that night. 
Reeve was given a conditional discharge.
91
 
  
Limited expectation of a successful outcome   
There are no easily collectable quantitative data available on the incidence of successful 
prosecution, for example, ĨŽƌŝůůĞŐĂůĞǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ^ĂĨĞƌZĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐĂƐĞůŽĂĚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ
that just under a third of their cases of threatened eviction cases are successfully defended 
by the tenant who either sustains their tenancy or who exercise the choice to leave later on 
their own terms. Awareness of the substantial obstacles blocking a successful prosecution 
has so far lowered expectations that bringing a case was very much an exceptional activity. 
One of the stakeholders, a specialist in housing law, indicated that almost all cases started 
ǁŝƚŚĂƌŝƐŬĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŽƐĞĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐĂĐĂƐĞǁŽƵůĚďĞǁŽƌƚŚƚŚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐ ?ƚŝŵĞ
given the uncertainty as to outcome and if indeed any award against the landlord would be 
enforced. The obstacles to successful prosecution have simply stifled any incentive even to 
try.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This section has indicated that, despite the regulation laid out in Chapter 2, and evidence of 
serious crimes discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there are substantial obstacles to enforcement 
and to securing housing justice in the case of landlord and letting agent criminality. All 
statutory service delivery depends on the availability of resources, but decisions also have to 
be made around strategic working and prioritisation. The penalties for offending are too 
weak to act as a deterrent for criminals, and both the quality of the outcomes and the 
likelihood of success also act as a disincentive even to attempt to secure legal redress. This 
unwillingness to prosecute, in turn, further encourages criminal behaviour to flourish.  
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6. Recommendations 
 
These recommendations are aimed at the government, local authorities, the Crown 
Prosecution Service and the Metropolitan Police.  
 
The Government should 
1. Place a duty (not just a power) on the police to enforce the provisions of the 
Protection from Eviction Act 1977 
This is required because without a statutory duty resting clearly with one agency, the spirit 
and intentions of this statute are not being delivered. If illegal eviction is not being 
prevented, not only is there irreversible anxiety and trauma and loss occurring, but there is 
no effective redress for to its many victims. Homelessness arising from such illegal evictions 
is also costing every London council an unknown amount, likely to be run into hundreds and 
thousands of pounds a year. 
2. Create a fund so that local authorities can recruit expertise and capacity to pursue 
civil penalties regime under Housing and Planning Act 2016 
Regulation of the private rented sector is, for the most part, not a statutory duty. Pressures 
on London councils honouring duties that are statutory have hollowed out their resources 
and capabilities to use the discretionary powers that they have. Even where powers are 
used to their maximum, in discretionary licensing areas and where strong political will exists 
to support a proactive approach, upscaling programmes of enforcement against criminal 
landlords requires pump-priming cash to get staffing and systems up and running, to make 
use of the new civil penalties system. 
3. Place a legal requirement on on-line platforms hosting private rentals adverts, to 
ĚŝƐƉůĂǇĐůĞĂƌĂĚǀŝĐĞŽŶŚŽǁƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚƐĐĂŶƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĨƌŽŵůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐ ?
criminal behaviour and to police criminal activity by disabling offending accounts. 
A substantial proportion of problem lettings originate through on-line platforms, where it is 
very easy for landlords and their agents to conceal with identities, denying the victims of 
criminal behaviour any protection or redress. The internet platforms are able to contribute 
timely information to prospective tenants searching their platforms to reduce the risk of 
harm to them and at the same time, to protect their own brand reputations. These 
platforms have shown little appetite for self-regulation and so government action is now 
urgently needed to mandate it. 
4. Introduce a duty on local authorities to prepare local multi-agency strategic housing 
plans that include provisions for joint working that cover housing options, 
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homelessness and regulation of the PRS, Planning, Trading Standards and policing to 
detect and prosecute landlords ? and agents ? criminal behaviour. 
Significant barriers to enforcement exist. These include the highly fragmented and complex 
regulation; multiple disciplines involved in enforcing it; and lack of co-ordination. This 
inevitably leads to: missed opportunities for delivering the positive outcomes intended by 
that framework; wasted resources; and preventable harms to the tenants of criminal 
landlords. The value of multi-agency working has long been evidenced, reported and 
encouraged yet even where good practice has been embedded, in the current environment 
of post-austerity, that good practice often not sustained. Key individuals move on, external 
ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĨŽƌ ‘ƉŝůŽƚƐ ?ĐŽŵĞƐƚŽĂŶĞŶĚ ?ŽƌŶĞǁŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ take priority over old. Unless there 
is established mandatory framework for multi-agency working in key areas such as 
regulating the private rented sector, services will continue to under-perform and under-
deliver.   
5. Amend all housing legislation to introduce joint and several liability for housing 
offences to include the property owner. 
At present only some housing and landlord/tenant statutes can be enforced against the 
owner of the property that is being misused in private renting. Where a landlord and an 
agent are both able to evade liability for offences committed or committed in their name, 
by accusing each other of responsibility for it, tenants who are the victims of criminality 
have very little prospect of getting protection or redress. Action taken against rogue agents 
does not succeed in the successful recovery of fines or damages, as the agent may not have 
any assets. Yet it is the property owner who ultimately profits from a letting and owns the 
asset. The property owner should be accountable for conducting due diligence on any 
agency agreement entered into. Standardising housing and landlord/tenant law in this way 
will open up a route to redress for many private tenants to whom it is currently denied. 
6. Remove S21 and replace ASTs with statutory longer fixed term tenancies with a duty 
for landlords to provide written tenancy agreements that comply with statutory 
requirements 
A majority of renters in the shadow PRS do not even try to exercise their tenancy rights, 
because those rights are so thin as to not be worth fighting to defend: paying to take out an 
ŝŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ‘ǁŝŶ ?ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌsix months of living under harassment and in poor 
conditions seldom seems worth it. Improving security of tenure would encourage more 
tenants to defend their tenancy and seek redress where landlords operate illegally.  A lack 
of written tenancy agreements is a common source of ignorance and confusion for landlords 
and tenants as to statutory rights and obligations. 
7. Introduce a right to expert statutory advocacy for private renters faced with any 
criminal behaviour by landlords 
 
Low paid workers in the private rented sector are seldom eligible for legal aid in housing 
cases, even where the type of offence qualifies (limited to threat of or actual eviction). They 
are rarely in a position to self-finance a defence or claim. The law is of such complexity it is 
also rare for anybody to be able to act as a Litigant in Person. Access to justice is therefore 
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widely denied. The system of statutory advocacy could be expanded to include a right for 
people suffering from criminal action by a private landlord to have access to expert para-
legal advocacy, for which local authorities would be required by law to have budgetary 
provision and to procure appropriately qualified services. 
 
Local authorities should 
8. Adopt targeted means to detect unlicensed HMOs, including expanding data-sharing 
and monitoring all on-line platforms advertising private rentals 
There are models of good practice in intelligence-led joint working with IT applications that 
have been built to support it. However, the requirements of the General Data Protection 
Regulations have wrongly led to many authorities failing to share data where they are 
permitted to do so, in the course of their duties in detecting, preventing and prosecuting 
crimes. There is a need for positive guidance to encourage lawful data-sharing, on which 
basis more effective and cost efficient intelligence-led enforcement work could be founded. 
9. Work with the police to enforce the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, and actively 
pursue prosecutions of offenders in such cases  
The level of fines for illegal eviction incentivises criminal landlords to evict illegally, as it is 
typically cheaper to do so even if prosecuted, than follow legal due process. Since fines do 
not act as deterrents preventing the offence from happening in the first place is the only 
way to protect tenants from losing their home, often their possessions and often also their 
mental health. Furthermore, homelessness arising from such illegal evictions is also costing 
every London council an unknown amount, but running into hundreds and thousands of 
pounds per year each. If and when police services begin to intervene to prevent evictions 
under this Act, any illegal evictions that do arise and which police are unable to prevent 
should be considered for other types of redress, including supporting Rent Repayment 
Orders and criminal prosecutions of offenders by the local authority. 
 
The Crown Prosecution Service should 
10. Institute centralised collection and reporting on illegal evictions 
 
At present, the political will for changing the law or increasing resources to tackle the high 
level of illegal evictions is undermined by the complete absence of reliable data on the scale 
of the problem. As a precursor to fundamental change, it is urgent that the data that would 
support it be collected, analysed and monitored. 
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The Metropolitan Police 
 
11. Work with councils to make more active use its powers to enforce the Protection 
from Eviction Act 1977 
 
If councils are to use their powers to prosecute criminal landlords, all evidence gathered by 
the police in the course of exercising their powers to prevent illegal eviction should be put 
at their disposal by the police, for efficiency and effective resource deployment. 
 
12. Review its training around evictions 
 
The Metropolitan Police should review its training around evictions. At the least, it should 
not be possible for criminal landlords to call on the police to support illegal eviction. Tenants 
who are victims of crimes such as threats, assault and damage to their property should have 
a reasonable expectation of justice. The police and enforcement officers should explore the 
benefits of a closer working relationship leading to a more active approach to investigating 
and prosecuting criminality in the PRS. 
 
 
